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I I I . STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has statutory jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2)(i), Utah Code Annotated. However, as argued alter in the brief, 
John denies that the appeal is timely, or that the issues appealed 
were properly certified. If that is determined to be the case, the 
Court would be denied jurisdiction based on timeliness only. See 
also Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
IV . ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Can a party to a stipulated custody decree 
later attack it and appeal from it? 
Legal question, judged for correctness. Settlement of a case 
bars attack or appeal. Dury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662 
(Utah 1966); Ebert v. Ebert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987). 
I I . Must the trial judge enter comprehensive 
Findings in a custody determination arising from 
default and stipulation? 
Legal question, correction of error standard. But abuse of 
discretion as to adequacy of specific findings. Ebert v. Ebert, 744 
P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987). 
vi 
III. When a litigant tells the court that she 
gives up, is it appropriate to allow her attorney to 
withdraw her answer and proceed by default? 
Discretion afforded to t r i a l court i s broad in child custody 
a w a r d s . Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P . 2 d 1 5 6 , 159 ( U t a h App. 1 9 8 9 ) . 
IV. Was the appeal timely? Assuming to 
specific time limitation was exceeded, does the 
doctrine laches protect a two year old custody 
decree from attack? 
As to time limitations, a question of law reviewed de novo, smith 
v. smith, 793 P.2d 407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). As to laches, abuse of 
discretion standard. 
V. Was the trial court's custody award an 
abuse of discretion? 
Discretion afforded to t r i a l court i s broad in child custody 
a w a r d s . Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P . 2 d 1 5 6 , 159 (Utah App. 1 9 8 9 ) . 
VI. Can evidence which is several months old 
be deemed to be "newly discovered" for purposes 
of a motion to alter or amend? 
Mixed question of law and fact, applyinq Rule 52, URCP. 
(Utah App. 1989). 
vii 
VII. If there is no newly discovered evidence, 
does an improper motion to alter or amend a 
judgment extend the time for appeal? 
Question of law, applying Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and Rules 52 and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
VIII. Does appeal time on a custody award 
run from the date of the custody decree, or from 
the denial a year later of a motion to set it aside? 
Question of law, applying Rule 4, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, and Rules 52 and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IX. Where a Petition to Modify custody is 
pending, absent certification for appeal, is denial 
of a motion to alter or amend an order refusing to 
set aside a custody decree an appealable order? 
Question of law, applying Rule 54, Utah Rules Civil 
Procedure. 
V. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
All of these authorities are included in the Appendices and are 
therefore not set forth verbatim here. 
viii 
V I . STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
INTRODUCTION 
This appeal is an assault on a custody award that is beyond 
attack, both legally and factually. The Findings of Fact, conclusions 
of Law and a custody Decree were entered by the trial court only after 
Karen's counsel agreed to them and approved them by his signature in 
November, 1991. Even if the time period within which she could have 
asked the court to consider setting aside the judgment had not 
already passed, her actions and those of her attorney waived any 
defect she might have otherwise claimed. 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Stripped of irrelevancies, this is essentially an appeal from 
the motion of Defendant/Appellant Karen Thompson (hereinafter 
"Karen"), seeking to set aside a 2 year old stipulated custody 
decree, granting sole permanent custody of the parties1 daughter, 
now age five, Deborah Putvin-Thompson (hereinafter "Deborah"), to 
Plaintiff/Appellee John C. Putvin (hereinafter "John"). 
John and Karen are Deborah's natural parents. Their 
relationship was a union of conscience, based on a belief in the 
religious fundamentalist practice of plural marriage. John and his 
wife Donna took Karen as a plural wife, and a few years later Karen 
1 
gave birth to Deborah. Karen and Donna, who lived side by side, 
both shared with John, by agreement, the care of and bonding with 
Deborah. John has since abandoned the practice of polygamy. 
This case began one night in May, 19 91, when Karen absconded 
unilaterally with Deborah, then age 3, and John sought through the 
justice system to continue raising Deborah. He received sole 
permanent custody by stipulation and decree in 1991, and now, much 
later, Karen wishes to undo the agreement- Deborah has lived with 
John and Donna for more than half of her young life. In the 
meantime, there was a multiple day trial on the issue of visitation. 
R. 709-715, transcripts of trial included in record on appeal. The 
trial changed visitation but not custody. 
B . COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Complaint. John filed a complaint against Karen in May, 
1991 and later amended it. He prayed for custody of Deborah, then 
age 3, asked for an injunction against Karen from removing Deborah 
from Salt Lake County, and for other relief. R. 2-6, 161-165. When 
he filed, Karen had absconded with Deborah while John slept, and 
was concealing her somewhere in the northwest United States and 
Canada. Id.; R. 9-12. The case was assigned to the Honorable 
Timothy R. Hanson, Third District Court, Salt Lake County.1 
2. Restraining Order. Concurrent with filing of the initial 
1
 Initially Judge Leslie Lewis was assigned, but she 
g r a n t e d J o h n f S unopposed Motion for Recusal. R. 1 7 9 . 
2 
complaint , t he Honorable Sco t t Danie ls en t e red an ex parte Temporary 
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause. R. 1 5 - 1 6 . Karen and h e r 
family were ordered to refrain from holding Deborah outside Salt 
Lake County, concealing her from her father John, or otherwise 
interfering with his custodial rights. R. 16. Karen was ordered 
to appear on May 30, 1991 to show cause why the restraining order 
should not become a preliminary injunction. 
3. Show cause hearing. Karen failed to appear before Third 
District Court Commissioner Michael S. Evans as ordered by Judge 
Daniels. Her attorney, Chase Kimball, appeared on behalf of Karen 
and her relatives. Recommendation and Temporary Order, R. 235-238. 
However, because Karen's family and associates were still 
successfully concealing her and Deborah from John, he was unable to 
accomplish personal service of the order upon Karen. R. 9-12.2 
4. Contempt. When Karen failed to appear and continued to 
hide his child, John moved for a contempt finding. Commissioner 
Evans, though, found that service was not adequate. 
Since the Court holds that she was not personally served 
with the Temporary Restraining Order, Karen Thompson 
cannot be held in contempt . . . , despite having 
continued to hold Deborah . . . outside the jurisdiction 
of the Court. The fact that [Karen] had actual notice of 
the restraint against withholding Deborah from [John], and 
of the hearing, but did not appear or comply, does not 
create contempt in the absence of personal service. 
jRe commendation and Temporary Order, June 25, 1991, p. 2 R. 236.3 
Service was made on Karen's family, others from her 
religious group and also at her last known address. 
3
 John timely rejected the recommendation, but Judge did 
not reverse this recommendation. Id. at R. 236 and 237. 
3 
5. Temporary custody (initial)* Evans awarded temporary 
custody to Karen. R. 236. To get the court to restrict John to 
limited, supervised visits, her counsel stated that John presented 
a risk of flight with Deborah4, falsely calling him a violent 
criminal. R. 236. Karen's allegations were serious enough that 
despite the lack of any specific claim of violence by John, the 
supervision was extremely restrictive. John was required to pay the 
cost of using health care professionals to supervise his first 
several visits with Deborah after Karen brought her back to Utah 
under court order. The irony is that John ended up with sole 
permanent custody, and Karen's visitation was initially supervised 
to prevent harm to or abduction of Deborah by Karen. 
This temporary award to Karen, an absent 
paroat who was still concealing Pe&orah in 
knowing contempt of court, illustrates the 
''possession is everything* tendency to 
maintain the status quo that seems to exist 
in Tkird District court* This unwritten, 
pervasive policy encourages steeling away by 
night with the childt as happened here* 
Attorneys who handle domestic cases in Utah 
know to advise clients that usually physical 
de £actv custody at the start of a case 
translates into <te iw» temporary custody/ 
which in. turn nearly always becomes permanent 
legal custody, Fortunately, after great 
effortr that outcome was reversed here* 
6. Pretrial matters. Many depositions were taken in the case, 
4
 She also called John a violent criminal, e.g. R. 94-133 
This character attack was later discounted entirely. See, e.g. 
polygraph test of Dr. Raskin, attached to Findings, R. 419-470. 
4 
and from May to November, 1991 it was very hard fought by both 
sides. See generally, R. 1 through 413. 
7. Guardian ad litem. The court appointed a guardian ad litem 
(at John's expense5), to independently represent Deborah's 
interests. Arnold Gardner, attorney with Littlefield and Peterson, 
was appointed by stipulation of the parties. R. 239-241. From that 
point on all agreements parties were approved by Mr. Gardner. 
8. Custody Evaluator. Early on, the court ordered a custody 
evaluation, again at John's expense. The parties stipulated to use 
Dr. Patricia Smith, who was appointed by the trial court.6 R. 39-
241. Dr. Smith did a thorough evaluation, with extensive testing 
and hours with the parties and others. John suggested and she 
requested a polygraph test to determine whether Karen's accusations 
had any basis (which was performed upon John by Dr. David Raskin, 
University of Utah). The parties stipulated that Dr. Raskin would 
do the testing, and the results would be admissible in any 
proceeding in the case. R. 335-336. The results were incorporated 
into the evaluation and the eventual stipulated Findings of Fact. Id. 
They showed Karen's fear to be unfounded. 
9. Stipulated custody change* Dr. Smith strongly recommended 
that custody be permanently awarded to John, and expressed strong 
concerns about Karen's mental state and a possible future abduction 
Although John has had to pay for virtually everything in 
this case, including other professionals, Karen's costs have been 
covered mostly by tithes of the Apostolic United Brethren. 
6
 Karen's counsel recommended Dr. Smith, and John agreed. 
Supplemental Temporary Recommendation & Order, R. 239-241. 
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by her. The parties then stipulated to change temporary custody to 
John, which was reduced to an order giving him temporary custody. 
R. 335-336, 351-352. Defense counsel Chase Kimball referred Karen 
to mental health therapy. Since September 1991 (some 2 and a half 
years) John has had continuous physical custody of Deborah.7 
10. Karen's letter. On November 4, 1991 Karen delivered to 
John, the court, counsel and the guardian ad litem a very disturbing 
letter, the contents of which contributed to the Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree limiting Karen's visitation. R. 419-470. A 
copy is attached as Appendix A. In it, she: 
a. Relinquishes permanent custody of Deborah to John; 
b. States that she continues to have the same fears that 
caused her to secretly take Deborah away. 
c. Announces that the court system is evil, and implies 
that she will seek extra-judicial relief. 
d. In essence, announces her default and surrender. Id. 
11. Court Conference. Judge Hanson ordered counsel to appear 
by phone at a scheduling and settlement conference on November 12, 
1991. R. 370-371. Participating were Judge Hanson, Karen's counsel 
Kimball, John's counsel (undersigned) and Mr. Gardner, Deborah's 
attorney. R. 414.8 The court had before it Karen's letter 
announcing and accomplishing her default. 
12. Default. Mr. Kimball orally withdrew Karen's Answer and 
Counterclaim and the court proceeded by default. R. 415, 419. 
7
 During that entire time, John has never requested nor has 
Karen ever paid any child support, and that remains the case. 
8
 See Affidavit of Arnie Gardner, attached as Appendix C. 
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13• Findings and Custody Decree* At that time respective 
counsel, including Deborah's guardian ad litem, agreed on behalf of 
their respective clients that Findings, Conclusions and a Decree be 
entered, giving sole permanent custody to John. Id. The parties 
also concurred (and the Court ordered) that Karen's visitation be 
supervised, due to emotional difficulties typified by her November 
4 letter. Findings of Fact, Conclusions and a Custody Decree were entered 
to that effect the next day, November 13, 1991. R. 415-470. A copy 
of the findings and decree are included as Appendix B. As entered 
in the record, the findings attached and incorporated the custody 
evaluation and November 4 default letter. R. 415-470.9 
14. Evidence and support for findings. The Findings and 
Conclusions, by stipulation of the parties, incorporate Dr. Smithfs 
court ordered custody evaluation and Karen's default letter as 
supporting evidence. In total they occupy 55 pages of record. Id. 
Before Judge Hanson entered the Findings of Fact, conclusions of Law and 
custody Decree, Karen's attorney, Mr. Kimball, signed each, approving 
them as to form and content. Id., Appendix B. 
Tiie following procedural history relates 
to post-judgment events. They are 
important as to Kare&'s attempt to set 
aside the judgment and then to alter or 
amend denial of ttiat motion. They also 
relate
 r however f to Karen*s current 
claim tkat, in retrospectt Mr, &i«&all 
was not really her attorney. 
9
 Those attachments, while very important, are not included 
in Appendix B. The letter is Appendix A. The custody evaluation 
is too large to conveniently include. R. 415-417. 
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15. No challenge to result* Karen never withdrew the letter 
nor appealed the decree. This is not surprising since she agreed to 
the terms through her attorney. No effort was made to set aside the 
decree until well over five months after it was entered. 
16. Kimball representation* Chase Kimball appeared for Karen 
from the May, 1991 outset of this case, R. 94, with an appearance 
in writing and in open court before she returned Deborah to Utah. 
The record attests that he continued to represent her until his 
April 30, 1992 withdrawal. R. 642-643. He withdrew 5 months after 
stipulating to default and approving the Decree for Karen. 
17. Letter. In the November 4 letter announcing Karen's 
decision to stop fighting (the courts "are not courts of justice" 
but are controlled by money), she acknowledges who her attorney is. 
"I am going against the advice of Chase [Kimball]" in giving up. 
She wrote nothing about discharging Kimball. Appendix A. 
18. Kimball Letter. On November 19, 1991 (a few days after 
the custody Decree was entered), Mr. Kimball wrote to Judge Hanson as 
Karen's attorney. R. 471-476.10 
19. Further filings on Karen's behalf. Kimball continued his 
very active representation in the case, filing: 
* January 27 Notice of Hearing and Change of Address. R. 484, 485. 
* January 30, 1992 Motion for Expedited Hearing - R. 489-490. 
20. Kimball affirms his authority. On January 31, 1992 Mr. 
10
 The oddness of Kimball's letter to the court evidences 
that it was drafted with Karen's approval. In addition to the 
letter, between the November decree and January 31, 1992 he filed 
2 other documents as Karen's counsel. R. 484 and 489. 
8 
Kimbal l f i l e d on Karen's b e h a l f h i s Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Strike and Motion for Sanctions - Response to Motion to Require Proof of 
Authority, along with a related motion and sworn affidavit.11 
Appendix D; R. 499-503. Karen (through him) stated: 
[AJttached hereto is the affidavit of Chase Kimball 
stating his representation of the defendants has continued 
from the time he answered the original complaint. . . . 
[T]his author will produce his client. Karen Thompsonr at 
a hearing . . . , and the Court may satisfy itself that 
she is represented by the author at that time. 
Id., Appendix D, R. 501-502 (emphasis added). Karen and Kimball are 
shocked that anyone would question that Mr. Kimball has always been 
Karen's attorney. Any doubt about that, they say, are "patently 
absurd". They seek sanctions against the undersigned for saying 
otherwise, stating that it should be "clear to the dullest 
intellect." Id. This was weeks after Mr. Kimball stipulated on 
Karen's behalf to withdraw her answer and settle the case. 
21. Court appearance. On February 3, 1993, 2 1/2 months after 
he and Karen now say in hindsight that they think he was de facto 
discharged, Kimball met with the undersigned in Judge Hanson's 
chambers, asking on behalf of Karen for an expedited hearing and 
(again) for sanctions against the undersigned attorney. 2-3-92 Min. 
Entry, R. 505. Importantly, the record shows that Karen appeared at 
this hearing with her attorney, Mr. Kimball. Id. 
22. Continued representation. Kimball then filed for Karen: 
* February 10 motion for unsupervised visitation. R. 515. 
11
 John's undersigned counsel had filed a Motion to Require 
Proof of Authority pursuant to Section 78-51-33, Utah Code. R. 
506-507. That precipitated the documents in Appendix D. 
9 
* February 13 r e q u e s t for r u l i n g on motion, and Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion to Relieve Guardian ad litem. R. 5 1 6 - 5 2 0 . 
* March 23, 1992 objec t ion t o proposed o rde r , R. 543-544, a l s o 
Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Psychological Evaluation. R. 5 4 8 - 5 4 9 . 
* March 30 , 1992 K a r e n ' s Request for Ruling and Proffer of 
Credentials. R. 5 7 7 - 5 9 2 . 
* April 14, 1992, Kimball approves order for Karen. R. 807. 
* April 27 Karen's motion (again), ex parte, for sanctions 
against John and his undersigned attorney (alleging witness 
tampering), R. 609-631, accompanied by long, caustic memo. Id. 
23. Withdrawal* April 30 1992 Kimball withdrew — the only 
time. R. 642-643.12 Only then did Karen retrieve from him her 
voluminous file. R. 643. The same day Kimball sent the court a 
copy of a letter he wrote for Karen's to psychologist Robert Howell, 
then newly appointed by Judge Hanson to evaluate Karen. R. 644. 
The next day, May 1, John filed a Notice to Appear or Appoint New 
Counsel. R. 645. Karen lacked counsel for only a week. 
24. Daniel Darger appears for Karen, May 8, 1992.13 R. 651. 
T&$ following is the b&giming of Karen'© 
effort to attaok the Custody Decree,, 
entered namely six mmths earlier and not 
attacked aatli May, 1S92* 
25. First attack on Decree, May 26, 1992 (6 months after 
12
 This occurred after Mr. Kimball derided Karen for making 
a false police report, claiming John had stolen a car from Karen. 
13
 Mr. Darger has never filed an actual appearance in this 
case. R. 651. The appearance attached to Karen's appeal brief 
was captioned for a separate personal injury case. 
10 
permanent custody award). Darger filed Karen's Motion to set Aside 
Default Judgment, one of the motions whose orders are appealed from. 
R. 658-704, Motion R. 707-708, Addendum R. 719-731. 
26. Trial. At a multi-day trial in May through July, Karen 
had the opportunity to prove she had bettered herself and was 
prepared for unsupervised visitation. R. 709-715, transcripts of 
trial included in 7 volumes in the appeal record, 1517-2334. 
27. Testimony. On May 9 and July 8, 1992 Karen testified 
supporting motion to alter visitation under Decreer claiming for the 
first time that Kimball acted without authority. R. 2170-2171. 
28. Modification. Judge Hanson liberalized visits, though not 
as much as Karen requested. Bench ruling, July 16, 1992, R. 2260-
2280. There was litigation over the appropriate content of the 
resulting visitation order. See, e.g. R. 855-882, 893-894. 
29. Findings and Order. December 10 1992, a year after the 
original decree, Judge Hanson made Findings of Fact, conclusions of Law 
on Defendant's Motion to Modify Visitation, R. 1125-1131, and his Order on 
Motion to Modify visitation. R. 1132-1137. The order eased Karenfs 
visitation restrictions, but left permanent custody with John. Id. 
Like the original, this was not appealed. 
30. Court denies relief from Decree. Comprehensive November 
18, 1992 Memorandum Decision, R. 1008, March 11, 1993 order. R. 
1362. This is said to be one of the orders Karen appeals from. 
31. Petition to Modify* On December 15, 1992 John petitioned 
the court to modify the custody Decree and supplemental, liberalized 
visitation. R. 1140-1149. John requested certain injunctive 
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relief, relating primarily to Karen's then current psychological 
state, relocation to Wyoming and renewed polygamist practices, and 
their effect on Deborah during visitation,.14 Id. 
3ahn*s petition to Modify is still 
pe&dincf and unresolved, and was pending 
when Karen filed this appeal • 
32. Motion to Dismiss* Karen moved to dismiss the Petition to 
Modify. The motion was fully briefed, then stricken for failure of 
defense counsel to appear at the hearing he arranged. R. 1364. 
33. New motion* On March 24, 1993, 16 months after entry of 
the Decree, 6 months after denial of her first motion for relief, 6 
months after entry of the modified decree, 4 months after receiving 
"new" evidence from Mr. Kimball, 4 months after the court granted 
her own motion to modify visitation, and 13 days after the formal 
order denying her relief from the original decree, Karen filed her 
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. R. 1369-1370. 
34. "New" evidence* Karen sought to alter or amend based on 
"newly discovered evidence which could not have been produced prior 
hereto". She also asked the court again to set aside the 1991 
custody award. R. 1369. The "new" evidence was that Mr. Kimball 
would now swear that he believes Karen's November 4, 1991 default 
letter discharged him (directly contradicting his prior conduct, 
statements to the court and sworn affirmation). R. 1380-1382. 
14
 John tried to accomplish the further protection for 
Deborah by way of a Motion to Reopen visitation, which was denied by 
the court on March 11, 1993. R. 1360-1361. 
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However, Mr. Kimball gave Mr. Darger the "new" information four 
months prior to the motion. Affidavit of Darger, R. 1403. 
35. Motion denied. On May 4, 1993 Judge Hansen entered an 
order denying Karen's Motion to Alter or Amend the order denying her 
attack on the original Decree. R. 1494. 
36. Sanction• The court found the motion frivolous or in bad 
faith, and entered a $380 fee sanction against Karen.15 R. 1494. 
37. Late Appeal* The Appeal was filed June 2, 1993, 30 months 
after the Decree and 3 months after the order denying the attack on 
the Decree.16 R. 1504-1505. 
C. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. At issue is custody of Deborah Putvin-Thompson, age 5 1/2. 
Karen and John are her natural parents. She lived with both for the 
first 2 years of her life, with Karen the next 4 months and with 
John the last 2 and a half years — most of her life. R. 
2. Karen's family for generations has practiced religious 
polygamy. She belongs to a closed society, the "Allred Group" or 
"Apostolic United Brethren." R. 10-11, 72-73. 
15
 The motion, argued April 19, 1993, purported to arise from 
new evidence and incompetence of Karen's prior counsel, and lack of 
authority of counsel to agree to the custody and visitation. But 
the evidence was available to Karen 2 years earlier, and the sworn 
statement used to support the motion was directly contrary to 
earlier sworn statements by the same attorney in this same case. 
16
 There is a serious question about appealability. There was 
no Rule 54, URCP certification, and yet a Petition to Modify, filed 
in December, 1992 remains outstanding in the trial court. 
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3. John, his first partner ("Donna") and Karen lived in their 
union of conscience from 1982 to 1991. R. 1964-1969. A few years 
after John took Karen as a plural wife, Deborah was born on May 13, 
1988. R. 10. Karen and Donna lived side by side, and by agreement 
shared with John the care of and bonding with Deborah. Id. 
4. Karen was unhappy in the relationship, in large part 
because she resented the close bond Donna and Deborah developed. R. 
1185-1188. She felt uninvolved in Deborah's life. R., Karen 
Thompson Depo. R.; trial testimony of Karen, beginning R. 1784. 
5. On May 9, 1991, while John slept in the home, Karen surrup-
titiously absconded with Deborah around midnight, R. 10, walking a 
considerable distance with Deborah, Depo., R, despite being advised 
by her therapists of legal means to separate from John. Id. 
6. Karen's father/religious leader17 picked them up on the 
highway and helped conceal Deborah with members of his sect. After 
a few days in Herriman, Utah Karen hid Deborah for about a month in 
the Northwest and Canada. Depo. She knew that the man who harbored 
them had been accused (not charged) with child sex abuse. Id. 
7. When Karen left, she intended to permanently deprive John 
and Deborah of one another's company, and to further deprive Deborah 
from the society of Donna and her other significant persons, 
including her brother, David McConnell Putvin. Id. 
8. The court issued an ex parte Temporary Restraining Order and 
order to show Cause, R. 15-16, ordering Karen and her family to refrain 
17
 Joe Thompson, Karen's father, has since been removed 
from the leading councils of that religion due to numerous 
accusations of sexual abuse of children over a number of years. 
14 
from holding Deborah outside Salt Lake County, concealing her from 
John, or interfering with his custody. R. 16. Karen was ordered 
to appear May 30, 1991 to show cause why the order should not become 
a preliminary injunction. Id. 
9. Despite actual knowledge of the order, Karen failed to 
appear or produce Deborah at the hearing. R. 235-238. Commissioner 
Evans awarded temporary custody to Karen. R. 236. Because Karen 
accused John of being a criminal, his first several visits had to be 
supervised by a health care professional, at John's expense. 
10. Even after Karen returned with Deborah under court order, 
she admitted might possibly abscond again if things went poorly, 
despite court orders to the contrary. R. 1803-1804, R. 101-114. 
11. Arnold Gardner, a Salt Lake Attorney, was appointed as 
Deborah's guardian ad litem by stipulation. R. 239-241. 
12. Deborah was found to suffer from post traumatic stress 
disorder as a result of the flight into the northwest, and her 
separation anxiety in being withheld from her father. R.1958-196918 
I Pobaxsh*® post traumatic stress II from beiiig takmx froa tfohB is ] continuing ai$d uu<li$put^d. || 
13. The Court ordered a custody evaluation, and the parties 
stipulated to use Dr. Patricia Smith, who was appointed by the 
court. R. 239-241. Dr. Smith met with, tested and evaluated the 
18
 Deborah's therapist is Karen Platis, LCSW, who specia-
lizes in treating and diagnosing small children. R. 1958-1959. 
Though Ms. Platis has been Deborah's therapist for a couple of 
years, for many months she had no attempted input from Karen. 
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parties exhaustively. John suggested and took a polygraph test to 
determine whether Karen's accusations were founded in fact. The 
parties stipulated that Dr. David Raskin of the University of Utah 
would do the test, and the results would be admissible in evidence. 
R. 335-336. The favorable findings were incorporated into the 
evaluation and the eventual stipulated Findings of Fact. Id. 
14. Dr. Smith's evaluation strongly recommends permanent 
custody to John, and expressed strong concerns about Karen's mental 
state and a possible future abduction by her. Immediately, the 
parties stipulated to shift temporary custody to John, and that 
change became a court order. R. 335-336, 351-352. Mr. Kimball 
referred Karen to mental health therapy. Since September 1991 (2 
1/2 years) John has had continuous physical custody of Deborah. 
15. Despite giving up, Karen refused to sign any stipulation; 
even one giving her standard, unsupervised visits. R. 2067-2068. 
16. On November 4, 1991 Karen sent to Putvin, the court, 
counsel and the guardian ad litem a very disturbing letter, the 
contents of which contributed to the Findings and Decree limiting 
Karen's visitation. See R. 419-470. The letter's contents caused 
great alarm, when coupled with the fact she refused to sign any 
stipulation, even if it gave her healthy, unsupervised visitation. 
R. 2066-2069. A copy of the letter is in Appendix A. In it, she: 
a. Relinguishes permanent custody of Deborah to Putvin; 
b. States that she continues to have the same fears that 
caused her to secretly take Deborah away. 
c. Announces that the court system is evil, and implies 
that she will seek extra-judicial relief. 
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d. In essence, announces her default and surrender. Id. 
17. Judge Hanson set a telephone conference for November 12, 
1991. R. 370-371. Involved were Judge Hanson, Karen's counsel 
Kimball, John's undersigned counsel and Deborah's counsel Gardner. 
Mr. K i m b a l l o r a l l y w i t h d r e w h i s C l i e n t ' s Answer and Counterclaim, 
allowing the matter to proceed by default. R. 415, 419. 
Mr* Kiij&foall agre<sd ©rally to Karen*s default/ 
Htade necessary by her strange posture • While 
refusing* to fight further through legal means, 
she refused to sign any of a series of written 
^stipulations offered to her, Most or all of 
tftem gave her better tergjs than she ended up 
w±£h ixi th* cu&t&dy ztearae* Instead, she 
alluded to self help or even impending death 
of John, ia Jn&r Hove«ber 4/ 1991 letter. 
18. Respective counsel, including Deborah's guardian ad litem, 
agreed for their clients that Findings, Conclusions and a Decree be 
entered giving John sole permanent custody. The parties concurred 
and the Court ordered that Karen's visits be supervised, due to her 
emotional condition, typified by her November 4 letter. Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions and a Custody Decree were entered to that effect the 
next day, November 13, 1991. R. 415-470. Appendix B. However, as 
entered the findings attached and incorporated the custody 
evaluation and the November 4 default letter. R. 415-470. 
19. In October, 1993 Karen married into a new polygamist 
household, and moved to Lovell, Wyoming.19 
The household is headed by Royston Hooper, who at last 
word was an alien without right to reside in USA. Hooper depo. 
17 
20• Karen's November 4 letter, besides announcing that she 
will stop fighting (since "the courts today are not courts of 
justice" but are controlled by money), identifies her attorney. "I 
am going against the advice of Chase [Kimball]", she said. The 
letter says nothing about discharging Mr. Kimball. Appendix A. 
21. In December, 1992 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
Defendant's Motion to Modify Visitation, R. 1125-1131, and Order on 
Defendant's Motion to Modify Visitation, R. 1132-1137, were entered. 
While relaxing Karen's visitation restrictions, the new order left 
intact the permanent sole custody award to John. It was not 
appealed. John was ordered to bring Deborah from New Zealand to 
Utah at his expense to visit with Karen 3 times yearly. Id. 
V I I . SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no legitimate basis for appeal. The Court should 
affirm Judge Hanson's ruling, with fees to John for the following 
reasons, any of which is enough to affirm Judge Hanson's actions: 
a. Karen has appealed from a stipulated decree, and cannot now 
complain about what she agreed to. 
b. The argument that her attorney did not really represent her 
is not credible, and the record is to the contrary. 
c. Karen's attacks on the decree were untimely. 
d. Karen's entire position is barred by laches and waiver. 
e. The trial court was in a position to judge the parties' 
fitness. Judge Hanson's broad discretion cannot be overcome here. 
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f. There is no "newly discovered evidence" for a motion to 
alter or amend. The "evidence" was known to Karen all along. 
g. Any defect is harmless, and the later modification of 
visitation after trial, cures any claimed defect. 
h. The Court lacks jurisdiction, because Karen was untimely 
and because there remains pending an unresolved Petition to Modify. 
i. Deborah having been in John's sole custody since September, 
1991, Karen cannot meet the high burden of showing that any ping 
pong custody award could be justified on remand. 
V I I I . ARGUMENT 
1. Karen can't appeal a stipulated decree* Settlement bars 
appeal from denial of a motion to alter or amend. Drury v. Lunceford, 
18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P. 2d 662 (Utah 1966); Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 
69 P. 465 (Utah 1902) (after colluding to settle, one can't set 
aside the decree under URCP 60(b)20 
2. The Court lacks jurisdiction,21 because the appeal was not 
timely* It should have been filed within 30 days after the date of 
entry of the order appealed from. Rule 4(a), Utah R. App. P. The 
20
 What Karen is really saying is that the award was an 
error. Besides the fact that a stipulated result is beyond her 
attack, she has also failed to marshal the evidence. 
21
 The Court is responsible to examine and question its own 
jurisdiction, or lack thereof, at any stage of the proceedings when 
it appears that jurisdiction is, in fact, lacking, silva v. Department 
of Employment Security, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1990). 
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appeal here challenges the November, 1991 custody Decree. It is 2 
years late, Karen's transparent attempt to extend the appeal time 
with her Motion to Alter or Amend does not restore jurisdiction. 
If Karen had misgivings about the Findings, conclusions and custody 
Decree, or claimed her attorney had wronged her, she should have 
moved within 10 days for new or amended findings or order. URCP 
52(b). Absent that, she could have timely appealed, but did 
neither. Her appeal came years after the custody award, months 
after the "new" evidence was known to Karen. Although it was filed 
within 30 days of denial of the Motion to Alter or Amend, that motion 
was filed 13 days after the order it seeks to reverse. 
3. The post-judgment motion was untimely. Karen does not 
claim she appealed within 30 days of the Decree, but that she timely 
appealed under Rule 4(b), Utah R. App. P. (appeal time runs from 
denial of post-judgment motion). But Rule 4(b) applies only ff[i]f 
a timely motion . . . is filed . . . under Rule 59 to alter or amend 
the judgment . . . ." Rule 4(b)(3), Utah R. App. P. Here the Rule 
59 motion was not legitimate, since the judgment it attacked was the 
Decree, not the motion for relief. No extension was granted.22 
"An untimely motion for a new trial has no effect on the 
running of the time for filing a notice of appeal." Burgers v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 1982); Vanjora v. Draper, 30 Utah 2d 
22
 The Motion to Alter or Amend was filed March 24, 1993. This 
was 16 months after the Decree, 4 months after the Court announced 
its denial of the motion to set aside the Decree, and 13 days after 
entry of the order denying relief from the Decree, since the Notice 
of Appeal was untimely, and is not helped by the Motion to Alter or 
Amend, this Court lacks jurisdiction. 
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364, 517 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1974). "This Court cannot take 
jurisdiction over an appeal which is not timely brought before it." 
Burgers, supra, 652 P.2d at 1322. Nor can this Court. 
The motion to alter or amend was really a motion to reconsider, 
which is not found in the rules and does not extend the time for 
appeal under Utah R. App. P. 4. 
4. There was no Rule 54 certification. John's Petition to 
Modify has not been ruled on. Since a key issue remains in the trial 
court, the appeal was improper. There was no URCP 54(b) 
certification. The remedy is dismissal of Karen's appeal. A.J. 
Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991); Steck v. 
Aagaire, 789 P.2d 708 (Utah 1990). The Petition to Modify may be 
eligible for certification as separate, but that was not requested. 
Nor was an interlocutory appeal sought. 
5. Karen is bound by her stipulation and waivers. Changing 
attorneys does not excuse her from stipulations and proceedings that 
are long since final. In Ebbert v. Ebbert, the appellant was held 
bound by his custody agreement, though he sought release from it at 
trial. 744 P.2d 1019, 1021-22 (Utah App. 1987). In Mr. Ebbert's 
Answer he had conceded custody to his wife. The parties so 
stipulated, but after legal wrangling couldn't agree on Findings,, 
conclusions and a Decree. Trial was held, at which time Mr. Ebbert 
sought to amend his complaint to seek custody. The trial court 
appropriately did not permit reopening that issue, since he 
stipulated earlier (though not in writing) that his wife get 
custody. Id. at 1021. There are real similarities to Karen's 
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effort circumvent the changed circumstances standard by "appeal". 
Howard v. Howard, 601 P. 2d 931, 934 (Utah 1979) is also 
applicable here. There the husband signed a waiver, but he sued to 
set it aside later, claiming it was induced by trickery. The 
Supreme Court noted that he had made no record of the supposed 
unfairness until much later. In light of his signed consent to 
default, the court was unwilling to consider relief from the effects 
of that waiver. Id. Like Mr. Howard, Karen has claimed she was 
duped or caught unawares, and much later attacked her own agreement. 
There must be a limit to such cold and hot behavior. Id. 
6. Karen's own acts and omissions and law of the case bar her. 
That is true of the original motion for relief from the custody 
Decree, and more true of the later Motion to Alter or Amend. Again, 
Karen's litigation mode appears to be an effort to avoid the 
reguirement that custody be modified only on showing a "substantial 
change of material circumstances." smith v. smith, 793 P.2d 407 (Utah 
App. 1990); Walton v. Walton, 814 P.2d 619 (Utah App. 1991). 
Karen' s ignores the fact that the 2 tier change of 
circumstances standard is meant to protect children like 5 year old 
Deborah against instability from ping pong custody. Walton, 814 P.2d 
at 622. She has made her bed, and now must sleep in it. 
7. Karen had every chance to protect herself. Trial was in 
May, June and July 1992, and Karen testified that in January 1992 
she learned of the documents approved by Mr. Kimball, and that he 
had agreed to default. See Tr. 150-160, R. 1857-1867. She even 
testified at that time that she had not considered Mr. Kimball to be 
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her counsel when the decree was entered in 1991. R. 1857. 
She cannot wait still another year, take advantage of the parts 
of the orders she likes, then try again what failed before, hoping 
to undo it and start over in this 3 year old custody case. Leaver 
v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980) (lack of diligence over time is 
laches); Sandy City v. Salt Lake Co., 827 P. 2d 227 (Utah 1992 ). 2 3 If 
permitted, the mischief such flip flops would do to custody of young 
children is frightening to contemplate. 
| judge Haiisoa* *mr« U&rger i*vw got to interrupt you > • | • , I think this record needs to be clear that I don't 
think anyone polled a&y fast oii&s on me by slipping a 
supervised visitation in front of me to sign. That was 
signed off on by both the lm$&x& * h& a matter of 
f routine, if both lawyers agree, and a brief reading of 
the document does&'t iiidio&te that it's illegal, or 
I immoral, or anything else, I generally sign it • * • * 
md l did tartm information regarding the Novea&er 4th 
letter. • » • there were some statements in there that 
mnld give my reasonable person some eoacera about not 
I only her wellbeing, but the wellbeing of the childr 
particularly the reference in there that she may be 
I required to take off again*1f ^rial 10, 1-14-92, R. 2214. 
Karen points to incompetence or lack of authority of Kimball as 
"new" evidence, but did not call him as a witness in her 1992 trial, 
nor depose him. Apparently she did not even interview him about the 
circumstances of the decree until that document was a year old. The 
record is before the Court and has always been available to Karen 
and her counsel, both current and former. These things were not 
This is not the only situation when Mr. Kimball was her 
counsel of record, but she later denied that he was representing 
her. ("I frankly did not consider him my attorney" at the point 
when she falsely reported two cars as having been stolen from her 
by John). May 29 tr., p. 155. See also p. 159. R. 1875-1879. 
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done in the dark, and there is no trickery or surprise. 
At trial in Summer 1992 Karen testified that she knew Kimball 
was involved in a court conference, that Judge Hanson issued an 
order at that time changing visitation, which order ended the case 
and gave John sole custody. July 8 1992, 81-83, R. 2180-2182. Yet 
she has the audacity to claim that she was unaware until much later 
that her answer had been withdrawn and her default entered. 
As the court observed at trial: 
[T]he record shows that there was an agreement that the 
contesting papers on the part of Ms. Thompson would be 
withdrawn, and that this matter could go by default. And 
the court made a finding based upon I suppose [in part on 
this] letter. 
Karen and her attorney did not protest this accurate observation. 
Tr. May 29, 1992, pp. 144-45. R. 1847-1849. Judge Hanson expressed 
the problem Karen created for the parties and court by trying to 
change her position. And he pointed out how untenable it is to now 
claim that Kimball did not or should not have allowed default. 
BY THE COURT: What did you expect anyone to divine from 
this other than the fact that you had decided not to 
contest custody further going against the advice of your 
attorney number one? Did you expect anybody to read this 
letter, and get anything else besides that? 
A: I didn't expect it to become controversial, and people 
to assume that I was a risk — flight risk, and death risk 
to Deborah . . . . 
Q: Doesn't that mean that you're not going to proceed 
further with the custody issue? 
A: At that point, yes. 
Q: So why were you surprised that your attorney had no 
other alternative but to agree to your default if you 
write a letter saying you're giving up? What did you want 
us to do? Think you weren't telling us the truth? 
A: I don't understand the legal system that well. I was 
not doing too well with mv attorney. 
July 8 tr., p. 91, R. 2190-2191 (emphasis added). Amazingly, her 
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Motion to Alter or Amend, claiming Kimball was incompetent in allowing 
default, or that he was somehow not her attorney at all, was not 
filed until 8 months later in March, 1993. R. 1369-1428. 
8. Laches prevents what Karen seeks to do. One who seeks 
relief from a decree because of mistake, fraud or the like must 
pursue her rights promptly and diligently. Karen has done quite the 
opposite. 24 AmJur2d Divorce and Separation Sec. 488, p. 518 and 
authority there cited. Without regard to deadlines in rules or 
statutes, delay in pursuing one's rights can result in laches and 
deprive the movant from having a decree set aside. Karren v. Karren, 
25 Utah 87, 69 P. 465 (Utah 1908); 24 AmJur2d Divorce and Separation 
Sec. 487, p. 517 and authority there cited. 
Laches bar relief even if a decree was based on some basic 
procedural defect, such as improper service. Here, of course, Karen 
claims the court failed to enter her default. Id. As Judge Hanson 
observed at the trial, "If nothing else bars this, laches does. 
This has got to come to an end sooner or later. " Tr. p. 42, 
hearing on Motion to Alter or Amend, April 19, 1993. 
Much water has gone under the bridge since the decree. John 
has had sole custody for more than half of Deborah's life, most of 
that time under the custody Decree. For several months, Karen's 
visits were supervised and limited. In 1992 John moved to New 
Zealand with Donna and Deborah, where they have lived ever since. 
Karen's brief gives the impression that the move was a sinister, 
illegal act, but it was approved by court order.24 Deborah goes to 
24
 Order dated September 25, 1992, R. 967 
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school, has friends and lives her life there. As a result of a 4 
day trial in the summer 1992, Karen's visits became unsupervised 
late that year. John brings Deborah to Utah to visit with Karen at 
his expense 3 times a year for a total of 5 weeks. order on 
Defendant's Motion to Modify Visitation, R. 1132-1137. 
Karen had a duty to pursue her motion to resolution, and the 
delay from her filing of a Motion to Set Aside the decree in May, 1992 
(R. 707-708) to entry of the order denying the motion in March, 1993 
(R. 1362) should be charged to her. Failure to move it along to 
resolution constitutes further laches. 
Since the initial decree giving John custody, the trial court 
docket reveals much about what has occurred, and how far removed the 
in th» 16 months between th« custody j?&cr&& &n& the 
motion appealed from, there were 200 documents of 
nearly 900 pages* tiled, including two multi-page/ 
thoughtful and comprehensive M&marandwu Uecisions (R. jl 
1007-1018, m o l l i s ) and & formal orders, Many 
depositions covering 1000s of pages were taken
 t and 
<&JI additional 780 pages of trial &»d heariag 
transcript. Subsequent findings, conclusions and 
case is from what it would have been had Karen not delayed. It is 
hard to imagine a better example of laches. 
9. There is no "new evidence". The Motion to Alter or Amend is 
based on Rule 59(e), URCP, which requires "Newly discovered evi-
dence, material for the party making application, which he could 
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at 
trial." Id., emphasis added. Here the claims that Mr. Kimball was 
not her attorney, or made a mistake, are all old. Karen and counsel 
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have had full access to Mr, Kimball for a year. And the evidence is 
not "material" in any event, especially after so much delay. 
The many annotations under Rule 59 appear to be universally 
against the motion. To prevail Karen must (but cannot): 
* Show the evidence is material and competent Universal inv. Co. 
v. Carpets, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 336, 400 P.2d 564 (1965); 
* Demonstrate that it is truly newly discovered Id.; 
* Show that it could not have been found and presented at 
trial, Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (Utah 1962); 
* Demonstrate that the evidence is not incidental or 
cumulative of evidence already presented, universal, supra; 
* Show that the evidence has substance, sufficient that it 
would reasonably have resulted in a different outcome, creiiln v. 
Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (Utah 1952). 
K&r<sxi*s failure to comply tfifcb Stale 59 ot to 
show a basis to alt«£ or emend is fatal and 
jurisdictional . lacking that, there was no 
legitimete lusls 59 ojrder, a#d the appeal was 
tiled 8&,,4a?ft aft ear the order, and 16 months 
a£te£ tha decree she r^aXJy saeks to attack. 
Here Karen has done none of those, either before or in her appeal. 
Her brief virtually ignores the requirements of URCP 59, and makes 
a token effort or none at all to show a need to alter or amend the 
order denying her motion to set aside the original decree, 
10. It's not a time or place to challenge stipulated findings. 
Karen's first point (brief p. 21-23) is to claim the Findings of Fact 
are insufficient. She phrases the argument as if she were appealing 
the decree, which she did not. Her attack on the trial court's 
findings typifies the basic flaw of her case: she tries to twist 
procedure to allow what is essentially an appeal of a Decree entered 
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over 2 years ago. She could and should have raised any criticisms 
then by objection to the court and, if unsuccessful, by appeal. 
Instead she raises the issue on appeal from a motion to alter or 
amend an order denying her earlier motion for relief from the Decree. 
11. The Findings of Fact are not defective. Karen's complaint 
here is that the Findings of Fact are not sufficiently detailed to be 
valid. Of course, if that is her position she could have objected 
to them or timely appealed. Instead, her attorney signed approving 
them as drafted, both as to form and content. 
Karen's cited cases are inapplicable here, and worse than 
unhelpful to the Court. This is because her authorities relate to 
legitimate appeals from contested decrees, while in this case the 
findings and decree are stipulated. And there was no appeal. 
She relies on Hutchinson v. Hutchinson, 649 P. 2d 38 (Utah 1982) 
and smith v. smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986) for the rule that trial 
courts should enter specific findings supporting custody awards. 
Br. 22-23. Sadly, she cites those cases as if they are squarely on 
point, ignoring the authority distinguishing them (see below).25 She 
compounds the misinformation by quoting from Martinez v. Martinez, 728 
P. 2d 994 (Utah 1986), Br. 23, and stating, "This is exactly the 
instant case." Id. It certainly is not.26 
25
 To appeal a pretrial loss on the merits may violate Rule 
33, Utah R. App. P. Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414 (Utah 1990). 
26
 Karen's Martinez itself (Br. p. 23) belies the statement that 
this "is exactly this case." It states that the findings must be 
more complete "when the custody award is challenged and an abuse of 
discretion is urged on appeal." Martinez, 728 P.2d at 994 (emphasis 
added). Here the award was not appealed nor challenged timely. 
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This Court has already compared and contrasted smith and Martinez 
to a case much more similar to this one. 
The smith and Martinez cases are distinguishable from the 
instant case. In smith and Martinez, custody was hotly 
contested and, therefore, detailed findings were required 
for appropriate review on appeal. In the instant case, 
custody was not at issue. . . . [T]he parties agreed 
custody should be awarded to defendant. 
Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019 (Utah App. 1987). That distinction is 
even more pronounced here. Not only was custody not at issue when 
the findings were entered (having been agreed on); they were 
stipulated to and not appealed. Then the resulting Decree was lived 
by for a considerable period before Karen attacked them. 
We hold that when custody is not an issue, the specific 
findings required when custody is contested are not 
necessary. To hold otherwise would burden the trial 
courts to prepare full, specific, detailed findings in 
every default divorce. We find the court's findings to be 
sufficient to support the custody decision. 
Ebbert, 744 P.2d at 1021-22.21 The findings in Ebbert which were 
deemed adequate contain language nearly identical to those here: 
"The Defendant is a good mother and a fit and proper person to have 
the care, custody and control of said two children." Id. at 1021.28 
It is impossible to place too much emphasis on Karen's express 
approval of the findings through her attorney. 
27
 Karen didn't reveal that Ebbert controls this case on the 
issue of the detail required for stipulated findings. Frivolous 
appeals are discussed below. Rule 3.3(a)(3), Rules of Proff'l. 
Conduct, UCJA (candor requires that the court be informed of 
contrary applicable legal authority). 
28
 Finding 2:"Putvin is a fit and proper parent to whom 
permanent custody and control of Deborah should be awarded." R. 
420. # 3: "The evidence demonstrates that Thompson may flee with 
Deborah, and should be required to submit to mental health 
treatment." 
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Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact and 
conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an 
issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
URCP 52(c). This is not a divorce case, so the exclusion from Rule 
52(c) is inapplicable. Karen agreed to default, subsection (1), 
consented in writing, which writing filed in the cause, subsection 
(2), and consented in open court through counsel. Id. While that 
consent is not reflected in the brief minute entry, R. 414, it was 
memorialized by her attorney signing the findings themselves: 
Respective counsel informed the Court of [Karen's] stated 
and written desire to withdraw her answer and proceed with 
this case by default. [Mr. Kimball], on behalf of 
[Karen], orally withdrew the Answer and Counterclaim. 
Findings, R. 419 (Appendix C); also, Decree, R. 415, Appendix B. 
12. There were extensive findings. They would be in 
compliance even if the matter had been contested and appealed. The 
body of the findings themselves includes not only the fact that 
Putvin is a "fit and proper parent to whom permanent custody and 
control of Deborah should be awarded" (Findings, par. 2, R. 420), as 
indicated by Karen's brief. The court also found, "[E]vidence 
demonstrates that Thompson may flee with Deborah, and should be 
required to submit to mental health treatment." Id. at par. 3. 
Further, the trial court's findings are not limited to those 
contained within the body of the document. Rather, substantial 
evidence was incorporated by reference into the Findings of Fact. 
The parties, through counsel, stipulated that the Court 
consider the court-ordered custody evaluation by Patricia 
Smith, Phd. and Thompson's November 4, 1991 letter to 
Putvin (both attached hereto) as evidence in the case. 
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, p. 1-2, R. 419-420. Karen 
failed to acknowledge those attachments in her brief. The 
evaluation is found at R. 413-466, and Karen's letter is R. 467-470. 
Incorporating those documents by reference and annexing them to the 
Findings was not required here, where custody was not at issue. 
Ebbert v. Ebbert, 744 P. 2d 1019, 1021 (Utah App. 1987). However, it 
was done out of an abundance of caution. 
As supplemented by the attachments, the Findings include the 
following as it relates to John's fitness for custody29: 
* John has above average expressive skills and frustration 
tolerance and is a motivated, efficient worker. R. 434. 
* John's intelligence is in the 95th %, with superior memory, 
mental control, reasoning, visual reproduction, motor speed and 
ability to differentiate essential and inessential detail. Id. In 
other areas, such as spatial relationships, he is High Average. Id. 
* John was guarded, defensive, and presenting himself in best 
light. He tends to misinterpret others' motives. He is sensitive, 
romantic, compassionate and artistic, in contrast with Karen's claim 
that he is aggressive and controlling. R. 435. 
* John was independent and extroverted, but also impulsive and 
self righteous. Id. He likes to help others, but believes his 
intentions are misunderstood. Id. He had no depression, thought 
disturbance or intentional antisocial practices. R. 437. 
* John had difficulty empathizing with Karen. R. 436. The 
religious plural marriage was uncomfortable for John, and he 
eventually rejected the polygamist lifestyle. R. 436. 
* John's wife Donna lived with John and little Deborah during 
the marriage and helped raise her. R. 437. John shows caring 
dedication for family, exposing Deborah to good education, music, 
language and other opportunities. Id. 
As to Karen's fitness for custody, she found: 
Dr. Smith's unusually comprehensive Custody Evaluation also 
lists many pages of evidence which she considered in concluding 
Putvin should have sole custody. R. 413-430; 438-442. 
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* Karen has had much mental health treatment, R. 434-435, 449, 
but now showed no thought disturbance. R. 441. She was depressed 
at puberty and while with John. At times she felt suicidal, and 
wrote a suicide note, got a gun but decided not to use it. R. 441. 
* She is considerate and polite. R. 438. She is a member of 
an LDS fundamentalist group which espouses polygamy.30 R. 440-441. 
She had many jobs, some ending in discharge. R. 439. 
* Karen fled with Deborah, then age 3, in May, 1991, and spent 
3 weeks with her in Washington. She said she felt John would 
blackmail her to prove her to be an unfit mother. R. 412. She 
feared John would flee with Deborah. R. 441. She would prefer to 
have custody, limiting John to supervised visitation. Id. 
* Karen resented the close bond between Deborah and Johnfs 
wife Donna. R. 441. She felt she was a "breeding cow" for John and 
Donna, who had no natural children together. R. 412. 
* In taking tests, Karen showed good attention, perseverance 
and ability to understand directions. Id. She was cooperative, 
appropriate, socially engaging and emotionally responsive. She has 
superior immediate auditory memory and motor skills. R. 412. 
* Her verbal and intelligence skills are High Average. R. 
413. Despite a college education, she is weak in educational and 
cultural experiences. Overall she has average to high average 
intelligence, but has been employed beneath her potential. Id. 
* Karen is defensive, unassertive, lacks self esteem and 
social awareness. R. 413. She was defensive in 1987 therapy, mini-
mizing problems. She is socially inexperienced and feels 
inadequate. She felt John imprisoned her and stole Deborah. Id. 
She admits to no fault in failure of her relation with John. Id. 
* Her MMPI may have been wrong. She answered "false" to so 
many questions that her profile was "subclinical". R. 413. She has 
a strong need for affection and attention, which makes her afraid to 
share her true feelings and beliefs. R. 414. 
* Karen misperceives that both John and his wife Donna have 
emotionally hurt the child Deborah. R. 414. 
* She is lonely, unfulfilled, bitter and resentful. R. 415. 
Taking Deborah shows poor problem solving. She fulfilled her own 
needs, but was unable to see that she caused Deborah stress and 
confusion by taking her from her home and loved ones. She is self 
righteous and immature about taking Deborah from John. R. 418. 
30
 On October 24, 1992, Karen remarried into a polygamist 
family, with which she now lives in Wyoming. 
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* She seeks custody due to guilt and anger toward John for not 
promoting a normal mother-child bond, R. 415. She needs Deborah to 
see her as a loving mother whom John prohibited from caring for her. 
R. 415. She feels it was fine to take her to herself to make up for 
lost time. Id. She thrives on time with Deborah. R. 416. 
* To Karen men are "persuasive, cunning, charming, devious and 
dishonest." R. 415. She believes John wants custody as a way to 
control Karen, and may resent Johnfs bond with Deborah. Id. 
* Karen shows poor judgment, use of community and family 
resources, unrealistic fantasies and problems holding a job. R. 
416. She believes her happiness is based on custody, but "has not 
demonstrated the necessary skills for full time primary care." Id. 
* Deborah bonded with John, and double bonded with Karen and 
her surrogate mother Donna. R. 463. John is involved in Deborah's 
development, support, education and cultural growth. Id. Karen's 
relationship with Deborah is more dependent, and Deborah shows 
regressive, immature, oppositional behaviors with Karen. R. 464. 
* Deborah is bright, advanced, and needs the education and 
culture John gives. R. 464. His finances are superior to Karen's, 
who has sporadic employment, with jobs below her education level. 
R. 463-464. Her lifestyle is less stable than John's. R. 464. 
There were also findings concerning John's wife Donna, R. 451-
453, and concerning Deborah herself, R. 455-462. 
* Karen's parenting skills are more limited than John's and 
his wife Donna's. R. 465. It is in Deborah's interest to continue 
in her environment with John and Donna, both of whom have been 
caretakers, with a non-custodial relationship with Karen. R. 465. 
* If Karen received custody, Deborah may be raised in a plural 
marriage relationship. Karen had poorly handled the relationship 
with John and Donna. R. 465. He will likely alienate Deborah from 
polygamy. Karen is more likely to alienate Deborah from John. Id. 
The parties stipulated that Dr. Smith's findings are evidence 
incorporated into the Findings, along with Karen's November 4, 1991 
letter to John. That letter is telling reading. The highlights 
include (with all emphases added): 
* "I will no longer fight with you to try and win custody. 
There is no reason to continue this battle in the courts. . . . I 
pray that the courts and you will be fair with my visitation and 
legal rights." R. 467. "I do not want to fight anymore because I 
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do not want Deborah being hurt any more. I could not stand before 
God, with my head held high, knowing that I stopped taking steps to 
protect and save my daughter." R. 470. 
* "Those fears that I have of you, the fears that made me run 
from you in May, are still just as real today as they were back 
then*" Id. "I also know that the courts today are not courts of 
justice, but they are controlled by those who have money." R. 468. 
* "I am not giving up and neither is my family, but we cannot 
fight the devil on his own ground." Id. "I know that sometime, 
somewhere I will have my Deborah* You cannot travel down the same 
course you are on, doing what you do to people and expect to 
continue to survive." R. 469. 
* "I now put Deborah into God's hands (not yours) and pray 
that the time will be short when I will be able to be a complete 
mother to her." R. 470. 
The court, John, his counsel and Deborah's guardian ad litem 
were concerned by the letter, which concern led to visits that were 
temporarily supervised for Deborah's protection. They, along with 
Karen's own attorney, agreed on Findings that included the custody 
evaluation, John's polygraph and Karen's letter, making them very 
comprehensive. For Karen's brief to highlight the supposed 
inadequate findings as a first argument is appalling and meritless. 
13. The Court entered Karen's default* 
Respective counsel informed the Court of . . . Thompson's 
stated and written desire to withdraw her answer and 
proceed with this case by way of a default matter. Chase 
Kimball, Esq., on behalf of Thompson, then withdrew the 
Answer and Counterclaim on file in this case. The 
parties, through counsel (including the guardian ad 
litem), stipulated that the Court should consider the 
court-ordered custody evaluation by Patricia Smith, Phd. 
and Thompson's November 4, 1991 letter to Putvin . 
as evidence in the case. 
Decree, p. 1-2; Findings, p. 1-2, executed by all counsel (emphasis 
added). Karen's agreement makes irrelevant the technical niceties 
about which she now complains. And the parties stipulated that 
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Karen's November letter, which itself constitutes a default, be 
attached to the Findings of Fact, and used as a basis for the custody 
decree. Karen's authorities are not on point. Each relates to a 
default judgment and timely motion to set aside which were 
appealed, or where default was a sanction in a contested matter. 
Karen is concerned that the clerk did not enter a default. 
While URCP 55(b)(1) allows a default to be entered by the clerk, 
subsection (1) of the same rule provides for its entry by the court 
in "all other cases." URCP 55(b)(2). As Judge Hanson stated, 
[W]hen people default, or say they aren't going to 
participate, like Ms. Thompson did in that letter, then 
I kind of take them at their word. And say if you don't 
want to be involved in it, the other side gets what they 
want. That's kind of what defaults are all about. 
Transcript of trial, July 14, 1992, p. 10-11, R 2214-2215. As 
Judge Hanson recognized, Karen's letter itself is a default, or 
became one when it was so stipulated by Mr. Kimball.31 Karen's 
The long and the short ti& tftat] at the pre-
trial coat sreacfc ia Hovexaber * * «, * the record 
J^iows that there was am agreement that the 
contesting papers on the part -of M&* Thompson 
would be wit3j8lj?«wo, and that this matter would 
go by default. &ttd the ctmxt made a finding 
based • - • in part oii that letter • &• 184?« 
argument that no default was entered, relying on p & B Land, inc. v. 
Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah App. 1988), can be charitably called 
31
 Karen expects the trial court to ignore her stipulation 
through counsel. This idea seems akin to a plain error doctrine, 
but such has not been argued and certainly does not apply. 
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misplaced and meaningless.32 The Klungervik defendants were not in 
default, had filed an answer (which was not withdrawn) and remained 
"full-fledged combatants". 751 P.2d at 276. That case merely 
points out that a default judgment should not be entered "where 
there is no default in law or in fact". Id., 751 P.2d at 277. In 
Klungervik neither side asked the court to strike the answer or 
enter default, but it was. Here all 3 sides asked for that. 
Here Karen withdrew all opposition. She did so in writing and 
directly, by sending her letter to the court, as well as through 
counsel, and actually stipulated to the relief granted. Karen 
calls Klungervik (supra) "squarely on point". Nonsense. Besides 
the differences pointed out, that court disregarded defendants 
answer against his will, because his response to a summary judgment 
motion was deficient; there was no agreement as there is here. 
14. The decree and findings accurately reflect the court's 
action* Karen cites Darrington v. Wade, stating that a court can 
always correct its error. 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991), cited at 
br. p. 26. She then makes a leap of logic, assuming that since the 
minute entry was less detailed than the Findings, error was made. 
This is not evidence of error. Not only is the minute entry 
consistent with the Findings and Decree, but Karen, through 
counsel, approved the content of both by signature. Actually 
32
 It is disturbing that Karen calls Klungervik "squarely on 
point". Such statements should be reserved for cases with similar 
facts and procedure. Similarly, after observing that in Klungervik 
the judge passed over part of the default process "by striking 
defendants answer" and proceeding to default, she says, "This is 
precisely what the court did in this case". Br. p. 24. Not true. 
Judge Hanson did not strike anything, much less over objection. 
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Darrington stresses the importance of timely attacking a judgment by 
a prompt URCP 60(b) motion or its equivalent, which Karen did not 
do. Id, 812 P. 2d at 457. Without citing any applicable authority, 
she asks the Court to impose a new, burdensome but useless duty on 
the judge and clerk. She wants the Court to require minute entries 
to be as detailed as findings and decrees. 
15. There is no violation of Rule 4-504, UCJA. That rule 
requires that a stipulation be written or on the record. That was 
done here. If there had been a defect, it was fully waived. 
16. The parties did stipulate* It is disturbing that Karen 
could allege (through counsel) that the parties did not stipulate, 
when she and her counsel both know otherwise. Evidence of the 
stipulation includes, but is not limited to, the following: 
a. The minute entry, which memorializes that the relief 
granted was upon "AGREEMENT OF COUNSEL" (capitols in original); 
b. The signature of both Karen's counsel (Kimball) and 
Deborah's (Gardner) on the Findings, indicating "approved" (not "as 
to form", as would be used in the event a signataries' client 
disagreed with the terms), see Findings, page 4, Appendix B; 
c. The signature of Karen's and Deborah's counsel on the 
Decree, approving it as to substance. See Decree, page 4; 
d. The Court's execution of the Findings and Decree, relying 
on approval by all counsel, his the judge's own recollection and/or 
notes of the phone conference and the clerk's minute entry; 
e. The recall and file notes of counsel33; and 
f. The parties' conduct, which has been wholly consistent 
with the mutual understanding reflected in the Decree. 
How then can Karen (through her counsel) claim with a straight 
face that the parties did not stipulate, and that their agreement 
33
 S e e , e . g . Affidavit of Arnold Gardner, Appendix C. 
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was not written? "Equity is not available to reinstate rights 
and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because one has 
come to regret the bargain made." Despain v. Despain, 627 P.2d 526, 
527, quoting Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1980). 
It is not necessary that a stipulation be read word for word 
into the record. The important thing is that the record reflect 
its existence. An agreement of the parties will not be enforced by 
the Court "unless it is evidenced by a writing subscribed by the 
party against whom it is alleged or made, and filed by the clerk or 
entered upon the minutes of the court." 73 Am.Jur2d stipulations 
Sec. 2 (1974) (footnote omitted, emphasis added); quoted with 
approval in Barker v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah App. 1987). 
17. The parties1 agreement cures any claimed defect. For 
example, where an instrument is stipulated to as a legitimate 
judgment, the assent cures the formal requirements of a judgment. 
73 AmJur2d stipulations Sec. 16, p. 554 and authority there cited. 
Having agreed to it, a party cannot later attack its validity. Id. 
See, McClelland v. Leahy, 75 Colo. 542, 227 P. 549 (1908). 
One is not generally released from her own stipulation.35 It 
is especially inappropriate to allow a party to withdraw a 
stipulation the parties have acted on, and where it is impossible 
to return the parties to their status quo ante. 73 AmJur2d 
34The strong emotion of a custody dispute is no excuse for 
an inaccurate procedural history. Rule 33, Utah R. App. P. 
35
 Karen never repudiated her letter, or asked to be released 
from her attorney's agreements. Rather, she attacks the Decree, as 
if the judge should paternalistically ignore her express desire to 
surrender custody, and counsel having signed the documents. 
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stipulations Sec. 12, p. 547 and authority there cited. Here 5 year 
old Deborah has been in Johnfs sole custody pursuant to the Decree 
for some two and a half years. Father and daughter have moved to 
New Zealand, and the Court requires that he bring her to Salt Lake 
thrice yearly for extended visitation with Karen. 
So after taking advantage of portions of the Decree which favor 
her for 26 months, Karen wishes rid herself of the whole thing. A 
party will not be allowed to take advantage of the agreed terms she 
likes, and then withdraw the portions she does not. See, Id. at 
page 548; 73 AmJur2d stipulations Sec. 13, p. 549; 24 AmJur2d Divorce 
and Separation Sec. 488, p. 518 and authority there cited. 
Courts do not relieve one from a stipulation if the other 
party will be substantially prejudiced. 73 AmJur2d stipulations Sec. 
13, p. 548 and authority cited. This Decree has been in effect for 
over 2 years. The evidence present then may not be available for 
retrial. And the custody evaluation may be stale. 
A stipulation settling a case is more durable and harder to 
attack than stipulations as to issues or procedure, and the party 
attacking it has a high burden of persuasion. Id. 
18. Mr. Kimball did represent Karen. As demonstrated by the 
facts and procedure above, the record shows it, and Mr. Kimball's 
affidavit two years ago says so.36 The Court and all counsel and 
parties have been consistently told the opposite. 
If the Court had to choose to believe Mr. Kimball when he 
swears he was Karen's counsel at the relevant time and the new one 
that says he thinks he was not, it is worthwhile to consider that 
the statement that he was her attorney was closer to the event. 
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Even if Mr. Kimball had been ostensibly fired, the court and 
respective counsel had no choice but to recognize him. 
When an attorney is changed . . . written notice of the 
change and of the substitution of a new attorney or of 
the appearance of the party in person must be given to 
the adverse party; until then he must recognize the 
former attorney. 
Section 78-51-35, Utah Code (1917) (emphasis added). 
Kimball's affidavit is inconsistent with the record. Besides 
the obvious inaccuracy of claiming he was not Karen's attorney, the 
details show a lack of credibility. For example, he claims that 
"several days later" he was asked by John to sign approving the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Custody Decree. In fact, the 
record shows they were signed later that very same day, by him and 
the guardian, and the next day by Judge Hanson. Through counsel 
Karen has propounded that error throughout her papers. 
It is maddening to go through the exercise of showing all the 
acts Mr. Kimball did for Karen, but she has raised his nonrepre-
sentation as a serious appeal issue. Having so done, its bad faith 
nature and lack of merit cannot be assumed to be obvious to this 
Court. The following are included in the acts of Mr. Kimball which 
clearly belie the new claim that he did not represent his client: 
a. Kimball appeared in this case from the outset, May, 1991. 
R. 94. He appeared in writing and at hearing before Karen returned 
from hiding. The record attests abundantly that his representation 
continued until he withdrew April 30, 1992, R. 642-643, some 5 
months after his stipulation to default and approval of Decree. 
b. In Karen's November 4 letter (Appendix A) announcing her 
default ("the courts today are not courts of justice" but 
controlled by money) she acknowledges who her attorney is: "I am 
going against the advice of Chase [Kimball]" in giving up, she 
said. The letter says nothing about discharging Mr. Kimball. 
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c. On November 19, 1991 (after the Decree was entered), Mr. 
Kimball wrote to Judge Hanson as Karenfs attorney. R. 471-476. 
d. Kimball continued very active representation in the case, 
including the following additional documents he filed for Karen: 
* A January 27 Notice of Hearing and separate Notice of Address 
Change. R. 484, 485. January 30, 1992 Motion for Expedited Hearing -
Notice of Hearing. R. 489-490. 
e. January 31, 1992 Kimball filed Memorandum Supporting Motion 
to Strike and for Sanctions - Response to Motion for Proof of Authority, with 
related motion and affidavit. Appendix D; R. 499-503. He stated: 
[A]ttached hereto is the affidavit of Chase Kimball 
stating his representation of the defendants has 
continued from the time he answered the original 
complaint. • • • [T]his author will produce his client, 
Karen Thompson, at a hearing to be held this coming 
Monday, and the Court may satisfy itself that she is 
represented by the author at that time. 
Id., Appendix D, R. 501-502 (emphasis added). The papers express 
alarm that John doubted that Kimball has always been Karen's 
counsel. It calls any doubt "patently absurd", and seeks sanctions 
against the undersigned for suggesting uncertainty, since 
continuous representation is "clear to the dullest intellect." Id. 
f. On February 3, 1993, 2 1/2 months after he and Karen now 
say in hindsight that he might have been discharged, Mr. Kimball 
appeared in Judge Hanson's court, seeking an expedited hearing and 
(again) sanctions against the undersigned attorney for John. 2-3-
92 Min. Entry, R. 505. Importantly, the record shows that Karen 
appeared at this hearing with her attorney, Mr. Kimball. Id. 
g. Further representation• February 10 he filed a motion for 
unsupervised visits. R. 515. February 13 he asked for hearing, 
filing a Memorandum Opposing Motion to Relieve Guardian ad litem. R. 516-
520. March 23, 1992 he objected to a proposed order. R. 543-544. 
h. March 23 he filed Response to Motion to Require Psychological 
Evaluation. R. 548-549. March 30, 1992 he filed her .Request for 
Ruling and Proffer of Credentials. R. 577-592. April 14, 1992 he 
approved one of several orders. R. 807. April 27 he again moved, 
ex parte, for sanctions against John and his attorney (for "witness 
tampering"), R. 609-631, with a long, fiery memorandum. Id. 
i. April 30, 1992 Kimball withdrew for the only time. R. 
642-643. Attached to the withdrawal is a statement that then (so 
not before then), Karen retrieved from him her file. R. 643. 
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j. On the same date he wrote for Karen a letter to Dr. Robert 
Howell, appointed to psychologically evaluate Karen. R. 644. The 
next day, May 1, 1992, John filed his Notice to Appear or Appoint New 
counsel. R. 645. Karen lacked counsel of record for only a week. 
According to Karen's own testimony, in April 1992 she was 
"ready to fire" Kimball. Tr. of May 29, 1992 trial testimony, p. 
155-156, R. 1857-1858• How can she now in good faith base a motion 
and now an appeal on the claim Kimball had already been fired and 
did not represent her back in November of the prior year? 
19. If her attorney acted unwisely, Karen remains bound. It 
is very rare that incompetence of civil counsel is not attributed 
to the Client. Jennings v. Stoker, 652 P.2d 912, 913 (Utah 1982). 
Besides showing exceptional circumstances, Karen would have to 
demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of a different verdict. Id. at 
914. She repeatedly testified that giving up was her actual intent 
when the November Decree was entered. Her second thoughts were not 
raised until 6 months later. How could she claim the result would 
have been different if Mr. Kimball had not withdrawn her answer? 
20. The motion to set aside the Decree was untimely as well* 
The only argument Karen has for appealing now rather than in 1991 
when the Decree was entered is her Rule 60(b) URCP motion to set 
aside the judgment. R. 707-708, 658-704 and 719-731. 
Interestingly, Rule 60(b) is hardly mentioned in Karen's brief. 
A party wanting Rule 60(b) relief faces 2 layers of time 
restrictions. The motion must be brought "within a reasonable 
time" and, where applicable, "not more than 3 months" after the 
order. URCP 60(b). Karen filed her 60(b) motion May 26, 1992, 6 
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months after the Decree, and failed to get an order on the motion 
until March 11, 1993. She is outside the 3 month limit, so she 
must show that her motion was brought within a "reasonable time". 
21. The motion is beyond a "reasonable time". A reasonable 
time is a real limit on relief from domestic decrees for "other 
reason[s] justifying relief". McGavin v. McGavln, 27 Utah 2d 200, 
494 P.2d 283 (1972) {motion for paternity retest and relief from 
decree not within 'reasonable time1 was too late to consider}. 
A "reasonable time" is determined according to the facts in 
each case, "considering such factors as the interest in finality, 
the reason for delay, the practical ability of the litigant to 
learn earlier of the grounds relied upon, and prejudice to the 
parties." Maertz v. Maertz 827 P.2d 259 (Utah App. 1992). Maertz was 
an adoption case, which observed that the needs of finality in 
cases involving children create a special need for finality. Id. 
22. Karen is estopped from assailing the Decree. This 
prevents her living with the Decree awhile, then undo it at whim. 
Karren v. Karren, 25 Utah 87, 69 P. 465 (Utah 1908) (attack divorce 
decree); 24 AmJur2d Divorce and Separation Sec. 488, p. 518. 
23. Deference is due the trial judge. Judge Hanson had a 
unique view of all the factors, to see the parties, their support 
persons and professionals testify, and to sift through the hundreds 
of file papers. He deserves deference to protect against Karen's 
attacks, thinly disguised as legal arguments. 
Judge Hanson heard the better part of 4 days of evidence. He 
was present and expressed on the record that he has actual recall 
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as to the settlement conference when the matter was settled. He 
dealt directly with Mr. Kimball and Karen, who now claim the former 
ceased representing the latter months before he withdrew. He was 
able to observe first hand whether there was some drastic 
incompetence as currently claimed by Karen. 
24. The attorney fee sanction was appropriate. Karen moved 
to alter or amend based on "newly discovered evidence", knowing the 
evidence was not new. Earlier in this same case, Kimball swore 
under oath to the opposite effect. Likewise, such a sanction is 
appropriate for this appeal of the same nonissues. Karen is bound 
by the Decree. Her efforts to escape having to show a substantial 
change of material circumstances are unavailing. 
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which 
had jurisdiction . . . binds all parties who have been 
served . . . . As to these parties the custody decree is 
conclusive as to all issues of law and fact decided and 
as to the custody determination made unless and until 
that determination is modified pursuant to law . . . . 
Section 78-45C-12, Utah Code (1980). See also, Section 30-3-7(1), 
Utah Code (1992) (decree of divorce absolute upon entry). 
25. Sanctions should be imposed on appeal* The many examples 
of irrelevant, frivolous and even misleading37 assertions are set 
forth above and will not be set out in detail here. It's an appeal 
of a 1991 decree the court is dealing with, and neither it nor John 
should have to do so. Unless Karen can show a substantial change 
of material circumstances justifying a modification, John should be 
37
 The effort to minimize the fact that Karen has perpet-
uated this sworn inconsistency on which Karen's whole effort is 
based, calling it "misperception in retrospect", is unhelpful. 
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finally left alone to raise and nurture Deborah, who suffers from 
post traumatic stress, so long as he continues as in the past to 
comply strictly with the court's visitation orders. 
Where an appeal is brought from an action that was properly 
determined by the trial court to be in bad faith, the appeals court 
must necessarily find the appeal to be frivolous under Rule 33, 
Utah R. App. P. Utah Dept. of Soc'l. Services v. Adams, 806 P. 2d 1193 
(Utah App. 1991). This is our case. Under that rule, double costs 
and/or attorney fees should be assessed. What Karen has filed and 
done is not grounded in fact or warranted by law. 
Where, as here, a domestic appeal is taken without basis for 
the arguments presented, or where the law or facts are 
mischaracterized, damages under Rule 33 may be called for. See, 
Eames v. Eames, 735 P. 2d 395 (Utah 1987). 
IX . CONCLUSION & RELIEF SOUGHT 
Karen has no basis for relief from her voluntary Decree. She 
really seeks to modify it without the changed circumstances 
required by 6-404, UCJA. Since Karen failed to appeal, she can 
change the Decree only through a petition to modify, showing 
Changed c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Anderson v. Anderson, 12 Utah 2d . 3 6 , 368 P. 2d 
264 (1962). Yet she argues as if on appeal. 
Karen fails to mention what an attack on a 26 month old 
custody award could do to her 5 year old daughter who, thanks to 
her ill-advised attempt to cut her off permanently from her father 
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2 years ago, is already in therapy for separation anxiety. 
Karenfs effort seems at best based on revisionist history; a 
retrospective interpretation of events from her own narrow 
perspective, without due regard to the facts. Karen's poison pen 
brief does little to remedy her lack of substance and merit. The 
current Kimball affidavit states that he was not Karen's attorney 
on November 12th. But on January 31, 1992 he told the Court that 
he never stopped being Karen's attorney. That fact was available 
and a matter of public record when Karen filed her current motion. 
The appeal was untimely, depriving the Court of jurisdiction. 
There is, therefore, no choice but to dismiss it, with costs to 
John. Further, John moves for an award of double costs and 
attorney fees on appeal. Rule 33, Utah R. App. P.38 Since the 
appeal lacks jurisdiction, and is based on a motion that the trial 
judge already found to be frivolous, it should be characterized the 
same here. A frivolous appeal for Rule 33 purposes is one which 
has no reasonable basis in law or fact. O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 
306 (Utah App. 1987). Bad faith is not required. Id. 
John requests dismissal of the appeal and affirmance of Judge 
Hanson's various rulings Karen has appealed from, with double costs 
and attorney fees on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted the 18th day of January, 1994. 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
38
 The fee amount may be imposed by this Court, or determined 
upon submission of an attorney fee affidavit with the trial court. 
46 
X. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Mitchell R. Barker 
349 South 200 East, # 170 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84111 
Telephone 364-5145 
Bar Number 4530 
I Mitchell Barker, certify that on this ^th day of January, 
1994 I served two copies of the attached Appellee's Response Brief 
upon Daniel Darger, Esq., counsel for the appellant in this matter, 
by mailing it to him by first class mail with sufficient postage 
prepaid, to the following address: 
Daniel Darger, Esq., 
1000 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mitchell R. Barker 
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APPENDIX A 
Karen Thompson letter dated Nov. 4, 1991 
November *•• iVVl 
Johnf 
1 have been doing some serious soul searching* 
especially since the events of the last few days* about what 
the future truly holds for Deborah and me. After considering 
these last ultimate demands you have made on met 
particularly using blackmail, I have prayerfully and 
carefully come to the decisions that in order to save my 
daughterf as well as my own integrity, 1 know I have no 
choice but to do the following. 
YOU know that you have dragged me through the dirt and 
the mire all through our so-called marriage* and through 
your vengeance 1 am once again being imprisoned by your 
unrelenting desire to control me* which is quickly choking 
my new-found life right out of me. Not only have you done 
everything you can* using every means in your hands to 
destroy me, but have also sought to destroy my loved ones 
and most particularly using such means to destroy Deborah. 
Consequently, 1 have come to the decision I am forced 
to make in order to maintain my own peace of mind and 
integrity, as well as Deborah's welfare. 1 will no longer 
fight with you to try and win custody. There is no reason to 
continue this battle in the courts, and 1 pray that you will 
cease this legal nightmare. 1 pray that the courts and you 
will be fair with mv visitation and legal rights. 
1 have become so frustrated with the "legal svstem". 
Ihose fears that 1 have of vou, the fears that made me run 
from you in May, are still just as real today as they were 
back then. If 1 accept your offer 1 am putting myself in the 
exact same position that I was in before. Controlling my 
everv action bv using Deborah as the bait, "(he only 
difference now is that it is put in writing. Ana yet nobody 
seems the least bit concerned about my fears. How can J even 
expect a fair fight when everyone is oniy concerned tor vour 
r lghts. 
John, vou have an unlimited supply of monev at your 
disposal, ana you know 1 have no more monev and neither does 
my family. 1 know that if we went before a iudge and 1 were 
to win custody, that your wrath and destruction would 
increase ten-fold. So 1 will no longer fight you nor will 1 
allow you to destroy my daughter in order to destroy me. Her 
vulnerable mind is being poisoned with so much hate towards 
me and my family, that it is starting to affect her all the 
time. It iust kills me to hear mv three-year-old child make 
hate statements aoout her favorite "significant others", 
such as James, Jarea, both of her grandparents, and all of 
her aunts and uncles that she has grown to love. She nas 
even made hate statements about people that she has not seen 
r r * ' '• 
for weeks! 1 do not understand how you can say that you love 
Deborah and then turn her against those that she loves. At 
least my family has enough human decency to use a different 
name when speaking about you when she is around, such as 
"Putvin"- a name that she is not familiar with. 
Vou know and I know that any just judge or attorney 
would never consent to the demands that you have made upon 
me, making me literally and totally your slave. I also know 
that the courts today are not courts of justice, but they 
are controlled by those who have the money. And you know who 
has the money. It is sickening to realize that Dr. Smith and 
the courts can take a baby away from her rightful and 
perfectly fit mother and then give her to her father who is 
a known criminal, all on the basis that you make more money 
than me. If we were to throw out the money issue, you would 
not stand a chance. And 1 will warn you, Dr. Smith, Mitch 
and everyone else, if you even try and make an issue out of 
my religous beliefs, the ACLU will take up the battle with 
me. The only reason why you have custody now is because of 
your illegal money. John, you will one day find that what 
you have bought with money through the courts on earth will 
NUT ultimately be upheld in the courts in heaven. What you 
buy will never be yours. Vou have that yet to face. 
I am going against the advice of Chase in making my 
decision not to sign your demands, and I know he will 
strongly disagree with me. He feels that I should sign and 
then wait for you to be arrested, but you are too smooth and 
untrustworthy for me to trust. And you have put too much 
fear into the hearts of the people that are eyewitnesses to 
vour crimes, that nobody dares come forward with the truth. 
And without their testimony you will probably never be 
arrested. 
I feel I am in the same situation as the mother who 
stood before Solomon in the bible, only this time justice 
has not been served. 1 would much rather die a thousand 
deaths than watch my child's mind, soul and general well-
being be slowly butchered by you and this custody hell, YOU 
are tearing her apart and dividing her, making a scapegoat 
out ot her mother in order to qet your way and be able to 
boast of your own strength. I feel that the only humane 
thing I can do in order to stop this atrocity is to let you 
have your way. I have no choice but let go and let God be 
your ludae. 
I am not giving up and neither is my family, but we 
cannot fight the devil on his own ground. I know that you 
will tell Deborah that her mother gave her up, but I will 
have a written record of all that has happened and have 
witnesses that know the true facts in this matter, YOU have 
destroyed any love or respect that I could have had for you. 
o r • ! * 
Not only is Deborah the only true love of my life, she 
is my best friend- It hurts so much to let go. But I do not 
feel that I have lost, nor that you have won. I know that 
sometime, somewhere I will have my Deborah. Vou cannot 
travel down the same course you are on, doing what you do to 
people and expect to continue to survive. One of these days 
you will fallt destroying yourself. 
All I have ever wanted was to be loved and to give 
love. 1 have this with Deborah but with your poison 1 see it 
slipping away. 1 love Deborah with all of my heart and 1 
will never stop loving her. 1 am sure you will use your 
silver tongue to convince her otherwise but the guiet 
language of love will always be heard over your shouting 
lies. I want to experience true love, honesty, kindness, 
caring, generosity, trust and partnership with a husband. I 
want to have more children. There is no way I can have this 
if you are still controlling my life in what I do and where 
I go. I want freedom to control my own destiny. 1 cannot 
have a normal relationship with anyone including Deborah 
under your conditions and demands. What good am I to Deborah 
if 1 can't even save myself; and if I accept your "offer" 
she will grow up having no respect for me. I cannot live 
with that. 
1 cannot live in a house that I feel is being bugged or 
accept the intimidation of being followed, watched, and 
wondering if you have entered the house in my absence. 1 ask 
you now John, to show some human decency and respect. 1 
intend to leave your house in Copperton, leave your car and 
possessions as soon as possible. I know I am bound by 
contract to live there, and that you can legally sue me for 
back rent. I will ask that you not enforce the contract, but 
if you must then so be it. I want my name taken off all 
contracts, insurance bonds, property, mortgages, etc. 1 hope 
that you will have the decency to be satisfied that you have 
full custody, and stop the threats against my friends and 
ramily. And that you will keep your promise that you have 
made to Owen and Lamoine. 
1 will not turn my back on my friends, Jerry Haynor was 
one of the only few people that 1 could turn to in my hours 
OT desperation. The only thing Jerry wanted to do was to 
help me, and he has sacrificed everything because of it. 
Please leave him alone. 1 WILL NOT turn my back on mv 
friends, and my family absolutely will not agree to your 
wishes and let Jerry be devoured by you. 
John, 1 want no part of your life from here on. And as 
Tar as Donna is concerned, 1 could not live with myself if 1 
let my sianature Qive Donna more rights to my own child than 
i have. Whatever riahts she receives will never be 
sanctioned by me. 
1 now put Deborah into God's hands (not yours) and pray 
that the time will be short when I will be able to be a 
complete mother to her. It is truly sad to realize that the 
"system" can take away my rights to make decisions for my 
dauqhter, just because of my lack of wealth. Maybe if I had 
not been so devoted to our relationship for the past eight 
years, I would now be more -financially secure. But because 
of my devotion to you? I am now broke. 
1 have no hard feelings towards David and Corina, and I 
hope that when David has his own child he will understand me 
better. I pray also that he will have the integrity to stand 
for what he honestly knows is riqht. 
li this battle is allowed to continue, you will be 
destroyinq our dauqhter in order to satisfy your own selfish 
desires and insatiable need to control. You have even gone 
so far as to overdose Deborah on medication when she is 
returned to me, which knocks her completely out cold. 1 
cannot let that go on. Nor will I allow you to destroy me. 
YOU are not my Bod, neither are you my husband, and 1 am not 
Qoino to be your slave or conform to the demands you make of 
me which are bound to reflect on Deborah and destroy her. I 
do not want to fight anymore because 1 do not want Deborah 
being hurt anymore, i could not stand before God, with my 
head held high, knowing that I stopped taking steps to 
protect and save my daughter. 
YOU may think you have fooled everyone, but you and 1 
know and God knows what you really are. You offer a home 
without rent. You offer food, clothing and anythinq else 
that a slave-master offers his slaves. This is what you are 
tryinq to make of me and everyone around you, wantinq them 
to conform to your whims and wishes. And the price we must 
pay is Deborah. I think you have been inspired by watchina 
Humplestl1tskin movies. He promised to spin straw into qold 
at the price of the first-born child. (1 have always 
wondered -just what he wanted with the child and 1 can't help 
but wonder now.) 
bod will be vour iudqe. 
bincerely, 
Karen L. Ihompson 
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APPENDIX B 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Custody Decree 
HUB DISTRICT COURT 
Third Jud.o.al D.strict 
NOV 1 U 9 9 1 / 
Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone: 486-9638 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, 
Defendants. 
et al., 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 910903188CS 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
On Tuesday November 12, 1991, by order of the Court, a 
telephonic pretrial scheduling conference was held. The 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presided. Plaintiff John Carl 
Putvin ("Putvin") was represented by Mitchell Barker; Defendant 
Karen Larie Thompson ("Thompson") was represented by Chase 
Kimball; the minor child Deborah Putvin-Thompson ("Deborah") was 
represented by Arnold G. Gardner, Guardian ad Litem. 
Respective counsel informed the Court of the status of 
the case, including Thompson's stated and written desire to 
withdraw her answer and proceed by default. Chase Kimball, on 
behalf of Thompson, orally withdrew the Answer and Counterclaim. 
The parties, through counsel, stipulated that the Court consider 
the court-ordered custody evaluation by Patricia Smith, Phd. and 
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Thompson's November 4, 1991 letter to Putvin (both attached 
hereto) as evidence in the case. Having considered such 
evidence and the pleadings in this case, the Court now enters 
its Findings of Fact as follows: 
1. The parties to this case, John Carl Putvin and Karen 
Larie Thompson, are the natural parents of Deborah Putvin-
Thompson, who has been sometimes known in the past as Deborah 
Thompson. 
2. Putvin is a fit and proper parent to whom permanent 
custody and control of Deborah should be awarded. 
3. The evidence demonstrates that Thompson may flee with 
Deborah, and should be required to submit to mental health 
treatment. Visitation should be supervised by a responsible 
party approved by Putvin, and should be exercised in a location 
and environment conducive to Deborah's best interests. The 
supervising party should remain at all times in the physical 
presence of Deborah, to insure her safety and well-being. 
4. Thompson should be permitted, after sufficient 
psychological treatment, to present to Putvin or his counsel 
such evidence as she believes establishes that her visitation 
should no longer be supervised. Putvin should be required to 
consider such information, and to make a reasonable determi-
nation as to the continued need for custodial supervision. If 
Thompson shall disagree with Putvin1s determination, she should 
then be permitted to petition the Court, and an evidentiary 
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hearing shall be held to determine whether the Court should 
enter an order relieving her of the requirement of supervised 
visitation. If the Court enters such an order, and it becomes 
final, thereafter Thompson should be entitled to standard 
minimal visitation. 
5. The Certification of Live Birth should be corrected 
by the State of Utah to identify John Carl Putvin, born December 
26, 1948, as the natural father of Deborah, and to correct her 
name to read "Deborah Putvin-Thompson". 
6. Arnold Gardner should be authorized to act as 
guardian ad litem in the event Thompson shall abduct Deborah. 
7. Putvin should be required to arrange for Deborah to 
have psychological treatment. 
8. The relationship of the parties was not recognized by 
the State of Utah. Such honorable relationship of conscience as 
did exist was terminated by Thompson on May 17, 1991. 
Having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
now enters the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
9. Sole custody of Deborah should be awarded to Putvin, 
subject to visitation by Thompson as set forth in the decree. 
10. The Certification of Live Birth pertaining to 
Deborah should be ordered corrected, naming John Carl Putvin, 
born December 26, 1948, as the natural father, and correcting 
her name to read "Deborah Putvin-Thompson". 
11. A Decree should be entered by the Court, incorpor-
ating the terms of these Findings and Conclusions. 
So found and concluded this / /* of November, 1991. 
By THE 20URT: 
Approved; 
Chas^4Cimball 
Attorney for Thompson 
U 
Ion. Timothy R. Hanson 
Third District Judge 
Arnold Gardner 
Attorney and guardian/ad 
litem for Deborah 
**"' ATTEST 
By 
Deputy •-/-.* 
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H L BD DISTRICT COURT 
Th£i Judical District 
m 1 3 1931 
|*LT Mitchell R. Barker, #4530 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone: 486-9638 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, 
Defendants. 
et al., 
CUSTODY DECREE 
Case No. 910903188CS 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
On Tuesday November 12, 1991, pursuant to order of the 
Court, a pretrial scheduling conference was held by telephone in 
this matter. The Honorable Timothy R. Hanson was presiding. 
Plaintiff John Carl Putvin (MPutvinM) was represented by 
Mitchell R. Barker; Defendant Karen Larie Thompson ("Thompson") 
was represented by Chase Kimball; the minor child Deborah 
Putvin-Thompson ("Deborah") was represented by Arnold G. 
Gardner, court-appointed Guardian ad Litem. 
Respective counsel informed the Court of the status of 
the case, including Thompson's stated and written desire to 
withdraw her answer and proceed with this case by way of a 
default matter. Chase Kimball, Esq., on behalf of Thompson, 
then withdrew the Answer and Counterclaim on file in this case. 
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The parties, through counsel (including the guardian ad litem), 
stipulated that the Court should consider the court-ordered 
custody evaluation by Patricia Smith, Phd. and Thompson's 
November 4, 1991 letter to Putvin (both attached to the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) as evidence in the 
case. Having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, the Court now orders, adjudges and decrees as follows: 
1. Sole permanent custody of Deborah, born May 13, 
1988, is hereby awarded to Plaintiff John Carl Putvin. 
2. Reasonable rights of visitation are hereby awarded 
to Defendant Karen Larie Thompson. 
3. Until stipulation of the parties or further order of 
the Court, Thompson's visitation with Deborah must be 
supervised. Putvin shall supervise such visitation himself or 
shall allow supervision by some responsible party who shall be 
previously approved by Putvin. Such visitation must be 
exercised in a location and environment that is conducive to 
Deborah's best interests. The supervising party shall remain at 
all times in the physical presence of Deborah, sufficient to 
insure her safety and well-being. 
4. Thompson shall submit herself to competent 
psychological counseling, by a mental health professional 
previously approved by respective counsel. 
5. Thompson may, after sufficient psychological 
treatment, present to Putvin or his counsel such evidence as she 
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believes establishes that her visitation should no longer be 
supervised• Putvin shall consider such information, and shall 
make a reasonable determination as to the continued need for 
custodial supervision. If Thompson shall disagree with Putvinfs 
determination, she may then petition the Court, and an 
evidentiary hearing shall be held to determine whether the Court 
should enter an order relieving her of the requirement of 
supervised visitation. If such an order is entered by the Court 
and becomes final, thereafter Thompson shall be entitled to 
standard minimal visitation. 
6. Under the circumstances described in paragraph five 
above, Thompson shall have the burden of coming forward with 
evidence, and also shall have the burden of proof at such 
hearing. If, upon full hearing, the Court finds that Putvin 
was unreasonable in withholding his consent under paragraph 
five, then the Court may, in its discretion, require Putvin to 
reimburse part or all of Thompson's attorney fees reasonably 
incurred in petitioning the Court. 
7. The Certification of Live Birth of Deborah shall be 
corrected by the State of Utah to identify John Carl Putvin, 
born December 26, 1948, as the natural father of Deborah, and to 
correct her name to read "Deborah Putvin-Thompson". 
8. In the event that Thompson, or her agents or those 
acting in concert with her, shall at any time abduct Deborah, or 
shall otherwise substantially interfere with Putvin1s custodial 
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rights, Arnold Gardner is empowered to re-enter the case and 
seek relief from this Court as guardian ad litem. 
9. Putvin shall submit Deborah to psychological 
counseling with a competent child psychologist. 
10. Each party shall bear his /fr her own costs and 
attorney fees in this action, 
SO ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THIS ( * day of 
November, 1991. 
B!/THE/COURT: 
i ^ - . 
on. Timothy R. Hanson 
Third District Judge 
ChaSe Kimball 
Attorney for T 
Arnold Gaud 
Attorney and guardiag^ad 
litem for Deborah 
ATTEST .--. 
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APPENDIX C 
Arnie Gardner Affidavit 
AFFIDAVIT OF ARNOLD G. GARDNER. JR. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Arnold G. Gardner, Jr., being first duly sworn upon oath 
deposes, and states as follows: 
1. I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of 
Utah. 
2. I was appointed to act as Guardian ad Litem for the child 
Deborah Putvin Thompson in the matter of John Carl Putvin v. Karen 
Larie Thompson, case no. 910903188CS, before Judge Hanson in the 
Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. That extensive settlement negotiations took place between 
John Putvin, represented by Mitchell R. Barker, Karen Thompson, 
represented by Chase Kimball and Deborah Putvin Thompson, 
represented by myself, during and preceding November 12, 1991. 
4. On Tuesday, November 12, 1991, a Pre-Trial Scheduling 
Conference was held telephonically between all counsel and Judge 
Timothy R. Hanson. 
5. Prior to the November 12, 1991, Pre-Trial, a letter from 
Karen Thompson was circulated to all parties dated November 4, 
1991. The gist of the letter was that Karen Thompson no longer 
wished to litigate the matter. During the Pre-Trial Conference, 
this letter was discussed together with the results of the Court 
Ordered Custody Evaluation performed by Patricia Smith, Ph.D. 
1 
6. During the discussions with Judge Hanson and counsel, Mr. 
Kimball made no indication that he felt he no longer authorized to 
act on Karen Thompson's behalf. In fact, his statements were to 
the effect that he did not agree with what his client was 
instructing him to do, but he felt he had no choice in the matter. 
My recollection is, that albeit reluctantly, Mr. Kimball on his 
client's behalf agreed that his client's default in the matter 
could be entered. In order to allow his client's default, Mr. 
Kimball agreed that her Answer to Mr. Putvin's Complaint could be 
withdrawn as well as her Counterclaim in the matter. Furthermore, 
Mr. Kimball agreed that in order to support the Findings of Facts 
to be made in this matter as required by law, Karen Thompson's 
letter of November 4, 1991, together with the custody evaluation of 
Patricia Smith, Ph.D. could be entered as evidence in the matter. 
7. I further recollect that during the telephonic conference 
all parties stipulated to the withdrawal of Ms. Thompson's Answer 
and Counterclaim and to the entry of her Default and agreed that 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and an Order in the case 
would be prepared and circulated among counsel. It is my 
recollection that because the matter was settled the matter was 
then not set for Trial. 
8. Later in the action, when Mr. Kimball's authority to act 
on behalf of Karen Thompson came in to question, Mr. Kimball filed 
with the Court an Affidavit a copy of which is attached hereto. 
9. I was relieved of my duties as Guardian ad Litem by the 
Court on April 8, 1992. From the time of my appointment as 
2 
Guardian ad Litem until my release, there was never any indication 
given by any party or counsel that Mr. Kimball was not authorized 
to act as counsel of record for Karen Thompson. 
DATED this ~/ day of January, 1994. 
LITTL^PIELD & PETER^O) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
penm, 
I 
! 
day of 
1 / *7 v 3 ? * « * - * Littlerield & Pttersoi 
i («( W>*C*\5h * * l 423 South 503 East 
1 \CA Vti%& &t SaP Lake City Utah 84102 
I ^ - - ^ - ^ ' ' ' V WV Commission Expires 12/9/95 
My"TTommrs^i^""Expires: 
13756 .a f f \ l 
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APPENDIX D 
Motion to Strike, Motion for Sanctions, Proof of Authority, 
Affidavit of Chase Kimball 
..,\\% " 
*t V l f H "J-
CHASE KIMBALL, of counsel (4993) 
WOODBURY & KESLER 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
^^^r^l 
.or 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et alii. 
Defendants. 
* 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO REQUIRE 
PROOF 
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS 
Civil No. 910903188 CS 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
COME NOW THE DEFENDANTS, and hereby move this court to 
strike the plaintiff's Motion to Require Proof of Authority. In 
the absence of the striking of said Motion, defendants hereby 
respond to said motion in the accompanying memorandum. 
Furthermore, as the Motion of plaintiff is obviously improper, 
defendant further requests that plaintiff and counsel be 
sanctioned pursuant to URCP 11 and UCA §78-27-56. 
DATED this 3 f day of January, 1992. 
Chase Kimbal 
Attorney for Defendants 
J K H Vt 4 b< ft 
CHASE KIMBALL, of counsel (4993) 
WOODBURY & KESLER 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
l(^da< 
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Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et alii, 
Defendants• 
* 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO STRIKE AND MOTION 
FOR SANCTIONS 
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO REQUIRE 
PROOF OF AUTHORITY 
Civil No. 910903188 CS 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
COME NOW THE DEFENDANTS, and hereby request the court to 
strike the Motion to Require Proof of Authority of plaintiff. 
UCA §78-51-33 requires that a party show reasonable grounds for 
making the motion, which is not shown in the motion. 
Furthermore, plaintiff has complained that defendant's motion for 
a hearing on visitation was made without a memorandum of support, 
even though the motion had been discussed with the court, and now 
plaintiff neglects to prepare a memorandum in support of his own 
motion. 
In response to the Motion to Require Proof, attached hereto 
is the affidavit of Chase Kimball stating his representation of 
the defendants has continued from the time he answered the 
original complaint. Pursuant to the above statute, an attorney 
may offer his own oath to prove authority. Furthermore, this 
author will produce his client, Karen Thompson, at a hearing to 
be held this coming Monday, and the court may satisfy itself that 
she is represented by the author at that time. 
Counsel for plaintiffs, Mitchell Barker, is acutely aware 
that defendants are represented by this author. He sat next to 
this author and argued against a temporary restraining order 
against his client as recently as ten days ago. It is patently 
absurd for him to now claim he is unsure as to this author's 
authority, and it is embarrassingly obvious that the only reason 
for his motion is to delay a hearing on visitation next week. 
Barker should be sanctioned pursuant to URCP 11, which 
states in part: 
The signature of an attorney...constitutes a 
certificate by him that he has read the pleading,... 
that to the best of his knowledge formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is 
warranted by existing law...and that it is not 
interposed for any improper purpose,... If a pleading... 
is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion...shall impose...an appropriate sanction. 
It is clear to the dullest intellect that the instant action 
has one purpose and one purpose only, to harass the defendant and 
slow down her process to gain normal healthy unsupervised 
visitation with her only child. This is particularly 
reprehensible in view of the fact that he is slowing down the 
defendant in order to give his client time to move to Australia 
and deny visitation altogether and in perpetuity. Barker knows 
this, and could not fail to know this. 
2 
UCA §78-27-56 allows for a party to recover his fees from 
another party that brings an action in bad faith, to wit: "In 
civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees 
to a prevailing party if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was without merit and not brought...in good 
faith." The instant action is a textbook example of a bad faith 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's motion should be stricken as improper, as it 
contains neither memorandum, nor a showing of reasonable grounds 
for doubt as to whether defendant is represented by this author. 
In the absence of the court striking the motion, attached hereto 
is the affidavit of this author giving his authority. 
Plaintiff and his counsel should be sanctioned for filing 
frivolous motions with only an intent to delay behind them. This 
delay becomes much more callous when it is made clear that the 
delay will only have the effect of allowing plaintiff to move 
10,000 miles away in order to deny reasonable visitation of the 
defendant Karen Thompson. 
WHEREFORE, defendant requests that the motion of plaintiff 
be denied or stricken. Defendant further requests sanctions be 
imposed against plaintiff and his counsel. 
DATED this 3 ' day of January, 1992. 
Chafed KimBall 
Attorney for Defendants 
3 O J J ^  J 
.ft '• -1 hi n 
CHASE KIMBALL, of counsel (4993) 
WOODBURY & KESLER 
265 East 100 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1100 
UzidtL** RK 
Attorney for Defendants 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
JOHN CARL PUTVIN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KAREN LARIE THOMPSON, et alll. 
Defendants, 
* 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHASE KIMBALL 
Civil No. 910903188 CS 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
COMES NOW YOUR AFFIANT, CHASE KIMBALL, WHO DULY SWEARS: 
1. That I am a licensed attorney in the state of Utah. 
2. That I am representing defendant Karen Thompson in the 
above-entitled case. 
3. The other defendants have been dismissed from this case. 
4. That only ten days ago I was arguing a motion in front 
of the court on behalf of Karen Thompson. 
5. That plaintiff and his counsel were both present at this 
argument. 
6. That they have absolutely no reasonable grounds to 
question that I have authority to represent Karen Thompson, as 
they have been dealing with me from the inception in this matter, 
or for nigh onto a year. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
January, 1992. 
K A 
day of 
NOTARY PU3L1C I 
Commission Expires f; 
February 22,1995 i 
UESHELLT.HAUSUAN j 
xrVSMted 4850 North #4 \ 
-
P 1 ^ 0 t a h 84041 
w'^-Xi-- * ^ w \ , ^l/n^nVi a 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that he telefaxed a copy of 
MOTION, MEMORANDUM AND AFFIDAVIT to M. Barker, 2870 S. State, 
SLC, UT 84115, and A. Gardner, 426 S. 500 E., SLC, UT 84102 on 
the above date. 
"j ^  \J 
APPENDIX E 
Determinative Statutes and Rules 
custody or visitation may not be rendered until a report on trnt investigation 
is received by the court. That investigation shall be conducted hv the Division 
of Family Services within 'M days of the courts notice and request for an 
investigation. In reviewing this report, the court shall complv with Section 
78-7-9. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-5.2, enacted by L. Human ' for "Social in the first sentence. 
1988, ch. 90, § 1; 1990, ch. 183, $ 14: 1992, The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
ch . 213, § 1. 1992, added the last sentence and made a 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- punctuation change, 
ment, effective April 23, 1990. substituted 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS of evidence indicating that the child had been 
sexually abused by her half-brother. Linam v. 
Evidence. King, 804 P.2d 1235 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Investigation. 
— Time for request. Investigation. 
—Time for request. 
Evidence. Husband's request for an investigation was 
Trial court's finding that child had not been untimely when he did not request an mvestiga-
sexually abused was reversed and the case was tion until after the court had decided the case. 
remanded for a redetermination of custody be- Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465 (Utah Ct. App. 
cause the finding was against the clear weight 1989). 
30-3-5.5. Petition to protect abused child — Jurisdiction 
under this chapter. 
( D A person who has filed a complaint under this chapter may also file a 
petition with the district court for a protective order for the protection of any 
children residing with either party to the action under this chapter. The 
petition and procedures shall be the same as for the issuance of protective 
orders in the juvenile court under Sections 78-3a-20.5, 78-3a-20.6, 78-3a-20.7, 
78-3a-20.8, 78-3a-20.9, and 78-3a-20.10. The court or the cohabitant may use 
the protections provided in this chapter and Title 78, Chapter 3a, Juvenile 
Courts, and when necessary, those protections under Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Offenses Against the Person, which provide for criminal prosecution. 
(2) A person who has obtained a protective order pursuant to this section 
shall notify any other court in which another action is pending or order is 
issued pertaining to the same family member named in the protective order. 
History: C. 1953, 30-3-5.5, enacted by L. came effective on April 29, 1991, pursuant to 
1991, chl 180, § 1. " Utah Const.. Art. VI. Sec. 25. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1991. ch. 180 be-
30-3-7. When decree becomes absolute. 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute: 
(a) on the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk in the 
register of actions if both the parties who have a child or children and the 
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section 
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program is administered and have completed 
attendance at the mandatory course provided in Section 30-3-11.3 except 
if the court waives the requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of 
225 
78-45c-ll JUDICIAL CODE 
shall be served with process or otherwise notified in accordance with Section 
78-45c-5. 
History: L. 1980. ch. 41, § 10. 
78-45c-ll. Ordering party to appear — Enforcement — 
Out-of-state party — Travel and other expenses. 
(1) The court may order any party to the proceeding who is in this state to 
appear personally before the court. If that party has physical custody of the 
child the court may order that he appear personally with the child. If the 
party who is ordered to appear with the child cannot be served or fails to obey 
the order, or it appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a 
warrant of arrest against such party to secure his appearance with the child. 
(2) If a party to the proceeding whose presence is desired by the court is 
outside this state with or without the child the court may order that the notice 
given under Section 78-45c-5 include a statement directing that party to ap-
pear personally with or without the child and declaring that failure to appear 
may result in a decision adverse to that party. 
(3) If a party to the proceeding who is outside this state is directed to appear 
under Subsection (2) or desires to appear personally before the court with or 
without the child, the court may require another party to pay to the clerk of 
the court travel and other necessary expenses of the party so appearing and of 
the child if this is just and proper under the circumstances. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 11. 
78-45e-12. Parties bound by custody decree — Conclusive 
unless modified. 
A custody decree rendered by a court of this state which had jurisdiction 
under Section 78-45c-3, binds all parties who have been served in this state or 
notified in accordance with Section 78-45c-5 or who have submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the court, and who have been given an opportunity to be heard-
As to these parties the custody decree is conclusive as to all issues of law and 
fact decided and as to the custody determination made unless and until that 
determination is modified pursuant to law, including the provisions of thi* 
act. 
History: L. 1980, ch. 41, § 12. 
Meaning of "this act." — See note follow-
ing same catchline in notes to § 78-45c-l. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Liability of legal or natural par- resulting from abduction of own 
ent, or one who aids and abets, for damages A.L.R.4th 7. 
700 
Rule 52 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 126 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction. Ful-
ler v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975). 
Cited in Wellman v. Noble. 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P.2d 701 (1961); Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55. 377 P.2d 186 (1962); Ortega v. Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P.2d 406 (1963); Meier v. 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 734 
(1964); Memmott v. U.S. Fuel Co.. 22 Utah 2d 
356, 453 P.2d 155 (1969): Telford v. Newell J . 
Olsen & Sons Constr. Co., 25 Utah 2d 270, 480 
P.2d 462 (1971); Flynn v. W.P. Harlin Constr. 
Co., 29 Utah 2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973); 
McGinn v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 529 P.2d 
423 (Utah 1974); Henderson v. Meyer. 533 P.2d 
290 (Utah 1975); Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 
530 (Utah 1979); State v. Hall. 671 P.2d 201 
(Utah 1983); Highland Constr. Co. v. Union 
Pac. R.R.. 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984); Gill v. 
Timm, 720 P.2d 1352 (Utah 1986i; Penrod v. 
Carter. 737 P.2d 199 (Utah 1987); King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Cox, 751 P.2d 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); 
Ramon ex rel. Ramon v. Farr, 770 P.2d 131 
(Utah 1989); Anton v. Thomas. 806 P.2d 744 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991); Reeves v. Gentile, 813 
P.2d 111 (Utah 1991); Hodges v. Gibson Prods. 
Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah 1991); Home Sav. & 
Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75A Am. Jur . 2d Trial 
§ 1077 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial §§ 266 to 448. 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which thev are written. 10 A.L.R.3d 
501. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 10. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
itv and to warrant instructions to jurv thereon, 
18 A.L.R.3d 88. 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jurv thereon, 18 
A.L.R.3d 170. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment. 38 A.L.R.3d 1281. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise. 41 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154." 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A.L.R.3d 128. 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products iiabilitv case. 52 
A.L.R.3d 101. 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51, and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury. 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310. 
Key Numbers. — Trial ©=> 182 to 296. 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
Rule 52 UTAH RULKS OF ('IVII. PROCEDURE 128 
—Child cus tody . 
The trial court must enter specific findings 
on the factors relied upon in awarding or modi-
fying the custody of a child. Hutchison v. 
Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38 <r tah 1982). 
—Contempt. 
This rule and § 78-32-3 require, for con-
tempt committed in the presence of the court, 
written findings of facts, conclusions of law and 
judgment. It is not enough that the court in 
open court announce in detail its findings, con-
clusions and decree. Brown v. Cook, 123 Utah 
505, 260 P.2d 544 (1953). 
Written findings are necessary to support a 
contempt judgment. Thomas v. Thomas, 569 
P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977). 
—Credibility of witnesses . 
Credibility itself is not a factual issue that is 
appropriately the subject of the trial court's 
findings; rather, the findings of the ultimate 
facts implicitly reflect consideration of the be-
lievability of the witnesses' testimony. Adop-
tion of McKinstray v. McKinstray, 628 P.2d 
1286 (Utah 1981). 
—Denial of motion. 
Subdivision (a) does not require that the de-
nial of a motion be accompanied by specific 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. State v. 
Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 (Utah 1984). 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
Where the modification of a divorce decree is 
granted, the trial court should make findings 
to indicate the reasons why modification was 
found to be appropriate. Christensen v. 
Chnstensen, 628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981). 
Court action on a request to modify a divorce 
decree is not included in those "decisions on 
motions" referred to in Subdivision (a), and 
therefore the trial court is not exempt from the 
requirements of Subdivision (a). Stoddard v. 
Stoddard. 642 P.2d 743 'Utah 1982); Montoya 
v. Montoya, 696 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1985). 
—Easement. 
In a suit to establish right of way for an irri-
gation ditch by prescriptive easement, where 
the pleadings made an issue of whether ease-
ment had been acquired and it was clear that 
the ditch had been used for more than twenty 
years to irrigate lands of plaintiffs, trial court 
was required to make a direct finding on that 
issue. Harmon v. Rasmussen, 13 Utah 2d 422, 
375 P.2d 762 (1962). 
—Evidentiary disputes. 
Although findings should be made on all ma-
terial subordinate and ultimate factual issues, 
it is not necessary that a court resolve all con-
flicting evidentiarv issues. Sorenson v. Beers, 
614 P.2d 159 (Utah 1980). 
—Juvenile action. 
In juvenile action, court must not only make 
findings to support the proof of every fact nec-
essary to constitute the offense charged, but 
also make findings to support the preliminary 
adjudication that the child is within the juris-
diction of the juvenile court. In re R.N., 527 
P.2d 1356 (Utah 1974). 
—Material issues. 
Failure to find upon all material issues 
raised by the pleadings is reversible error. 
LeGrand Johnson Corp. v. Peterson 18 r-
2d 260. 420 P.2d 615 (1966). ' t a^ 
It is the duty of the trial judge in contests 
cases to find facts upon all material issue?'« u 
mitted for decision unless findings are wai^ftj 
Bover Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 i\ 
1977). 
(
^Uh 
Although findings should be made on all 
issues terial subordinate and ultimate factual it is not necessary that a court resolve ail co 
flicting evidentiary issues. In re Estate f 
Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238 iCt. App. 1989)
 C ( J 
denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
Harmless error. 
Trial court's failure to make findings on 
material issue was harmless error where the 
evidence was clear, uncontroverted, and only 
capable of supporting a finding in favor of the 
judgment. Kinkella v. Baugh. 660 P.2d ^ 3 
(Utah 1983). 
—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
It is in the discretion of the trial court to 
adopt the findings as submitted to that court 
by the prevailing party, as long as the findings 
are not clearly contrary to the evidence. Boyer 
Co. v. Ligneii, 567 P.~2d 1112 (Utah 1977V 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Where a court adopts findings by a state en-
gineer which adequately define the rights of all 
parties involved in a water dispute, it is not 
necessary for the trial court to make its own. 
independent findings of fact and conclusions of 
law. In re Use of Water, 12 Utah 2d 102, 363 
P.2d 199 (1961). 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Caption. 
A document entitled "Plaintiffs' Objections 
and Additions to Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law" filed after entry of judg-
ment against plaintiffs was properly construed 
by the trial court as a motion pursuant to Sub-
division (b) because, regardless of how it is cap-
tioned, a motion filed within 10 days of the 
entry of judgment that questions the correct-
ness of the court's findings and conclusions is 
properly treated as a post-judgment motion; 
the substance of a motion, not its caption, is 
controlling. DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l Title Ins. 
Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Conformance with original findings. 
Where court on its own initiative amended 
jury's finding but within 10 days the defendant 
filed a motion to amend the judgment back to 
conform to the original findings, court had 
power, under this rule, to grant the motion. 
National Farmers ' Union Propertv & Cas. Co. 
v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 249, 61 
A.L.R.2d 635 (1955). 
New trial. 
Motion for amendment of findings, timely 
made and served upon all parties, invokes the 
continuing jurisdiction of the court and sus-
pends the finality of the judgment until the 
motion is ruled upon; if the interests of justice 
require setting aside the findings and judg-
t J uo o r i tv It. I'KOCKDl'Kr: 
1 * 
rnent of judgment, was not fatal to the defen-
dants ' appeal from a proceeding in equity. 
Uugan v. Jones, 724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986). 
H o w findings e n t e r e d . 
In assessing the sufficiency of the findings, 
the appellate court is not confined to the con-
tents of a particular document entitled "Find-
ings"; rather, the findings may be expressed 
orally from the bench or contained in other 
documents. Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
This rule does not mandate the entry of 
signed, written findings and conclusions. On 
the contrary, the court may even state its find-
ings orally if it chooses. Martindale v. Adams, 
777 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Judgments upon multiple c la ims or par-
ties. 
Pursuant to the requirement of Subdivision 
(a) tha t the trial court "find the facts spe-
cially," in order to facilitate appellate review of 
judgments certified as final under Rule 54(b), 
the trial court should enter findings supporting 
the conclusion that such orders are final and 
the findings should explain the lack of factual 
overlap between the certified and remaining 
claims. Bennion v. Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 
(Utah 1992). 
Judicial review. 
On review, the appellate court is not limited 
to written findings, and may properly examine 
findings expressed solely from the bench or 
contained in other court documents, such as 
court memoranda. Merriam v. Merriam, 799 
P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Equity cases . 
The "clearly erroneous" standard of review 
stated in Subdivision (a) is applicable in equity 
cases. Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 
1991). 
—Standard of rev iew. 
In reviewing an interlocutory order permit-
ting discovery where issues of fact are involved 
and there are no findings of fact, the court does 
not review the facts but assumes that the trier 
of facts found them in accord with its decision, 
and will affirm the decision if from the evi-
dence it would be reasonable to find facts to 
support it. Mower v. McCarthv, 122 Utah 1, 
245 P.2d 224 (1952). 
A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against 
the great weight of the evidence or if the court 
is otherwise definitely and firmly convinced 
that a mistake has been made. State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987); Western 
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Jack-
son Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987); Ste-
vens v. Stevens, 754 P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Southland Corp. v. Potter, 760 P.2d 320 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); T.R.F. v. Felan, 760 P.2d 
906 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State, In re N.H.B., 
777 P.2d 487 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 789 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Rilev. 784 
P.2d 1174 (Utah 1989); State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 
880 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The "clearly erroneous" standard applies 
whether the case is one in equity or one a t law. 
Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548~(Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 
P.2d 896 (Utah 1989); Bountiful v. Rilev. 784 
P 2d I 174 • I 'tan 19*9»: (I r ; ) h n x. <;r 
P.2d 320 U t a h Ct. App. i'^'Mh Sory **> 
trial court's award of damages will be 
on appeal, Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 p 9 j * 7 ^ 
(Utah Ct. ADD. 1987). cert d e m ^ in. **\ 
If there is a reasonable basis in PV»/4 
,
 1(3ene b e
 affin 
4 5
 P2H 
Ct. App. 1987). cert denied 76*
 D^
! 
1278 (Utah 1988). ' p24 
Application of the "clearly erroneous" 
dard in Subdivision (a) does not e l i m i n a t e d 
deference traditionally accorded the fact fi A 
to determine the credibility of witnesses S 
v. Wright. 744 P.2d 315 (Utah Ct. App.
 l 9 ^ 
Henderson v. For-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465 ( l ' / ' 
Ct. App. 1988). ' *** 
The "clearly erroneous" standard in Subdi 
sion (a) applies to review of competency
 DPn* 
ceedings because they are civil rather tha 
criminal in nature. State v. Lafferty, 749 P<u 
1239 (Utah 1988), atT'd, 776 P.2d_63l .Utah 
1989). 
On appeal of a judgment from the bench af. 
ter trial, the appellate court defers to the trial 
court's factual assessment unless there is clear 
error. Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Ap. 
pliance & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1988i-
Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770 (Utah 
1991). 
When reviewing trial court's finding based 
solely on written materials and involving no 
assessment of witness credibility or compe-
tency, the Court of Appeals is in as good a posi-
tion as the trial court to examine the evidence 
de novo and determine the facts, rather than 
review the determination under the standard 
set forth in Subdivision (a), which would defer 
to the trial judge's ability to assess the credibil-
ity of witnesses and set aside the finding only if 
clearly erroneous. In re Infant Anonymous, 
760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
When reviewing a bench trial in a criminal 
action for sufficiency of the evidence, the appel-
late court must sustain the trial court's judg-
ment unless it is against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court other-
wise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made. State v. Good-
man, 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if the 
appellant can show that they are without ade-
quate evidentiary foundation or if they are in-
duced by an erroneous view of the law. West-
ern Capital & Sees., Inc. v. Knudsvig, 768 P.2d 
989 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d 688 
(Utah 1989). 
Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if it 
can be shown that they are against the clear 
weight of evidence or that they induce a defi-
nite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 
156 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Monroe, Inc. v. 
Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
A finding attacked as lacking adequate evi-
dentiary support is deemed "clearly erroneous" 
only if the appellate court concludes that the 
finding is against the clear weight of the evi-
dence. Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 
P.2d 896 tUtah 1989); In re Estate of Grimm, 
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was insufficient to support the findings. Fitz-
gerald v. Cntchfield. 744 P.2d 301 iUtah Ct. 
App 1987 i. 
To mount a successful challenge to trial 
court findings under Subdivision ta) of this 
rule, an appellant must marshal the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings. Only then 
can the appellate court determine whether 
those findings are clearlv erroneous. Cornish 
Town \ . Roller. 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988). 
The challenging party must marshal all rele-
vant evidence presented at trial that tends to 
support the findings and demonstrate why the 
findings are clearly erroneous. West Valley 
City v. Majestic In v. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
The way to attack findings that appear to be 
complete and that are sufficiently detailed is to 
marshal the supporting evidence and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate to 
sustain such findings. But where the findings 
are not of that caliber, appellant need not go 
through a futile marshaling exercise. Rather. 
appellant can simply argue the legal insuffi-
ciency of the courts findings as framed. Wood-
ward v. Fazzio. 823 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 
199U 
—Found insufficient. 
Divorce case was remanded for adequate 
findings on the issues of alimony and fees, 
where no findings had been made regarding 
the wife's financial condition and needs, and, 
although the record contained substantial evi-
dence regarding the parties" financial situation 
and the reasonableness of the fees, the findings 
were deficient because they failed to evaluate 
these factors. Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
In divorce action, where trial court record 
did not reveal whether order regarding assign-
ment of retirement benefit? was intended as an 
enforcement or a modification of a previous or-
der, appellate court remanded the issue for the 
court below to make findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. Adeiman v. Adelman, 815 P.2d 
741 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Vaca t ion of j u d g m e n t . 
The failure of a trial court to enter adequate 
findings requires that the judgment be va-
cated. Anderson v. Utah County Bd. of County 
Commrs, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979). 
— F o u n d sufficient. 
Finding that "claim of plaintiff of the rela-
tionship of attorney client is not supported by 
the weight of credible evidence and the court 
finds said issue in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff' was sufficient in action in 
which plaintiff claimed the attorney had estab-
lished a professional relationship with her and 
was t<» purchase property at foreclosure sale for 
her; although more detailed factual findings 
would have been appropriate, such additional 
findings m this case were not mandatory. 
Sorensor. -.. Beers, (>14 P.2d 1S9 (Utah 1980) 
Sufficient evidence to support the finding as 
to division of marital property. See Colman v. 
Uolnian. 743 P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Findings of fact, based on expert testimony, 
and riot "clearly erroneous, accepted on ap-
Rush, 744 P ^ | 
*Hft 
peal. See O'Brien 
Ct. App. 1987). 
In divorce action, value of reti 
fits, as found by trial court, s u b a U i ^ * ! * 
record. See Canning v. C a n m n g 7 4 ? ] f t * ^ 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). ^ r 
In a fraud action, because there waa 
tial competent evidence to support ft] 
court's finding that no false reprei 
were knowingly made, and because U» 
late court was convinced that the h * 
made no mistake, the finding was M A . 
turbed on appeal. Brown v. Harry H»Hw~. 
Inc., 744 P.2d 1016 (Utah Ct. App^iSJ* 
Evidence found sufficient in a bench ttM 
support the trial court's judgment r n r n ^ 
defendant of second-degree murder Slafct 
Goodman. 763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1 9 8 8 ) / ^ * " 
Findings of fact, though not model of dam* 
were sufficiently detailed to reveal trial eaat 
reasoning processes. See Reid v. Mutual «f 
Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896 (Utah 19Q» 
—Opinion o r m e m o r a n d u m of dedaam 
An opinion or memorandum of decision ft** 
by a court sitting as trier of the fact Bay at 
consulted where the findings of fact and at* 
elusions of law are inadequate; and, if ta* 
opinion or memorandum contains the findo* 
of fact, that is sufficient compliance with Sub-
division (a). Sprague v. Boyles Bros. DrilUat 
Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956) 
A trial judge s memorandum decision can W 
regarded as findings of fact but only as to tha» 
findings recited therein. Thomas v. Thoma* 
569 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1977). 
—Reci ta ls of p r o c e d u r e s . 
"Findings of fact" must be more than aimph 
recitals of the procedures involved in thederr 
opment of the case. Anderson v. Utah Count* 
Bd. of Countv Commrs. 589 P.2d 1214 (Utaa 
1979). 
—Technica l e r r o r . 
Trial courts mere clerical oversight in tail 
ing to sign its findings and conclusions did «* 
require disturbing the judgment. Mart indak* 
Adams. 777 P.2d 514 (Utah Ct. App. 1989i 
—Ult imate facts . 
Findings should be limited to the ultimate 
facts and if thev ascertain ultimate facts, aw 
sufficiently conform to the pleadings and th* 
evidence to support the judgment, they w " ' ! * 
regarded as sufficient Pearson v. Pearson, 56! 
P.2d 1080 (Utah 1977). 
S u m m a r y j u d g m e n t . 
Findings of fact are unnecessary in conn** 
tion with summarv judgment decisions. TayW* 
v. Estate of Taylor. 770 P 2d 163 (Utah I * 
App. 1989>. 
—Sta t emen t of g r o u n d s . -
For an appellate court, a statement » 
grounds found by the trial court !«»justify sum-
mary judgment would be of great assistance, 
and in an appropriate case, failure to do so nW , 
justifv remand to the trial court. Masters*-
Worsley, 777 P.2d 499 -Utah ( t App. W*h 
Under Subdivision (ai the trial court is re-
quired to make a brief written statement 
explain which alternative theory n accepted* 
granting summary judgment llmvrver. fal1 
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PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
jkje 54. Judgments; costs. 
* fVifinition' form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
W& *P^r
 Dieadings t the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
f i C I
 \ Judgment upon multiple c la ims and/or involving multiple p a r t i e s . 
«*v more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
J * 0 counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
**
ilinr\ ^e involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
P * ^
 m ore but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
!SLrmination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
Zlrnrtss direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
**^!afld direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
hich adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
'•wer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
'-hums or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
i t any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
<c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against 
whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like 
memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the 
items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily in-
curred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs 
claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, 
file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court in which the 
judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the 
time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. 
(3), (4) (Deleted.! 
(e) Interest and cos ts to be included in the judgment. The clerk must 
include in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision 
t 'TAH Kl'I.KS OK CIVII. I'KOCKIH KK U t i l e .Vl 
^ . r a M not a process for appeal »f 
, * * 2 f s S T e x rel. State Dep t o. NK-,,,1 
• * * ^ U . 742 P2d 114 < Utah t.i. App 
, ot award. 
L n d u m of costs .s filed before 
iff^n^i costs in specific amounts are 
? t o * * t judgment, then a party d.ssat-
J S S o « e costs may have the nKht of 
„ .iter or amend the costs in the judK-
Rule 59(a)l3), enjoying thereby the 
_ , often days to do so rather than the 
**2?ricted period of seven days under 
J 2 « i <d*2> of this rule. Nelson v. New-
2jP.2d 601 (Utah 1978K 
- • ^ S T ^ ^ i t i o n s were taken but witnesses 
^ZuCied at trial, costs of the depositions 
* * V^nroDeriy includable within the cost 
'TlMl v Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 
"
 0f taking depositions of defendants f,tptn*» 
.^1 -m**ni contractor in materialman's action 
* 2 ^ f l 4-2-2 were assessable as costs where 
i r T IQ protect plaintiffs rights. Lawson 
v ^ f Co v. General Plumbing & Heating 
, v ! / 7 Utah 2d 84, 493 P.2d 607 (1972). 
T Wendant was not entitled to the cost of tak-
^ depositions where the depositions were not 
^U i t trial and there was no evidence pre-
*ottd that they were necessarily incurred for 
•w preparation of defendant's case. Nelson v. 
v,wman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). 
<'<*u of depositions are taxable subject to 
*m limitation that the trial court is persuaded 
•urt they were taken in good faith and, in light 
i ihe circumstances, appeared to be essential 
'or the development and presentation of the 
\m-. deposition costs should be allowable as 
«c*«sary and reasonable where the develop-
ment of the case is of such a complex nature 
;^ 4t discovery cannot be accomplished through 
'he leas expensive methods of interrogatories. 
-••quests for admissions and requests for the 
.fuduction of documents. Highland Constr. Co. 
* Union Pac. R.R., 683 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
The party claiming entitlement to the costs 
'{depositions has the burden of demonstrating 
hat the depositions were reasonably neces-
sary; determining whether that burden is met 
» within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
•' loyd's Unlimited v. Natures Wav Mktg., Ltd., 
>3 P.2d 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Discretionary. 
Subdivision id) leaves the question of costs 
•wmewhat in the discretion of the courts. Hull 
v Goodman, 4 Utah 2d 163, 290 P.2d 245 
1955). 
The trial court can exercise reasonable dis-
cretion in regard to the allowance of costs, but 
has a duty to guard against any excesses or 
abuses in the taxing thereof. Frampton v. Wil-
•*>n, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980); Hatanaka v. 
Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
<»nied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1987). 
In modification of divorce decrees under the 
continuing jurisdiction of the trial court, the 
question of the ability or inability of a party to 
Pay costs is a factual matter that lies in the 
(iiM.n-t inn ol the trial njuri. Hanlv V Haidv, 
77^ P 2<1 <H7 I lab Ct App. I'J^)1 
—Expenses of preparation for action. 
In a habeas corpus proceeding by parents 
against a child-placement agencv to • •htam 
custody of a child, expense items incurred by 
the agency in the taking of depositions and se-
curing certified copies of a marriage license 
and divorce decree in preparing for the action 
appeared to be reasonable and incurred in good 
faith, and these costs should have been allowed 
to the prevailing agency as a matter of course. 
Thomas v. Children's Aid Soc'v. 12 Utah 2d 
235. 364 P.2d 1029 « 196U 
The trial court did not err in not awarding 
the costs incurred by a wife in a divorce action 
who, after the suit was filed, secured the ser-
vices of an appraiser who was able to testify at 
length about his opinion of the identity, nature 
and net value of the marital estate after his 
inspection of various property and documents. 
His research and preparation, although essen-
tial to the presentation of the case, could not be 
considered a "cost."' Stevens v. Stevens, 754 
P.2d 952 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Failure to object. 
Defendant waived any error as to the costs 
allowed the plaintiff where defendant waited 
23 days after filing of cost bill before filing any 
objection. Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 
847 (Utah 1978). 
—Liability of state. 
The general terms of a statute giving costs to 
the prevailing party do not include the state. 
Tracy v. Peterson. 1 Utah 2d 213, 265 P.2d 393 
< 1954). 
The state is not liable for costs unless there 
is some statute or rule of court which expressly 
or by clear implication includes it. Section 
78-27-13 does not authorize the taxation of 
costs against the state but only provides the 
source from which such costs shall be paid 
when authorized. Tracv v. Peterson. 1 Utah 2d 
213, 265 P.2d 393 (1954). 
The Uniform Act on Paternity, Chapter 45a 
of Title 78, makes no provision for an award of 
costs against the state. State ex rel. State Dep't 
of Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). 
—Service on adverse party. 
This rule requires that only one verified copy 
be served and it is to be served to the court; 
there is no requirement that the copy served 
upon the party from whom costs are claimed be 
verified. Barton v. Carson, 14 Utah 2d 182, 280 
P.2d 926 (1963). 
—Statutory limits. 
Award of costs in excess of those expressly 
allowed by statute for service of subpoena, wit-
ness fees and preparation of model, photo-
graphs and certified copies of documents was 
improper even though the costs represented 
the actual expenses incurred; fact that Su-
preme Court has on occasion approved taxing 
of expense of depositions as costs should not be 
taken as opening the door to other expenses of 
the character claimed in the instant case. 
Frampton v. Wilson. 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
Witness fees, travel expenses, and service of 
process expenses are chargeable only in accor-
( T A H R I L L S <>r CIVIL PKOCKDI KL 
^ * « * r e a « * > n f o r d e I a y * . L ,-
- * * nt to the requirement m .subdivision 
" 'T ' fwe trial court "may direct the entrv of 
* I iudzment ... only upon an express de-
* ***^ uon bv the court that there is no just 
igt9$\<r delay ' and, because this determina-
* • * * ' S t e tna l court is subject to judicial re-
*** nder an abuse of discretion standard, a 
' ^ ^ o U n a t i o n should accompany all future 
Actions so that the appellate court may 
*"lJ.n informed decision on that question. 
^ * ^ v . Pennzoil Co., 826 P.2d 1.T7 (Utah 
o-view of finality. 
tvt initial question of whether an order is 
bfc for certification under Subdivision (b), 
' W h e t h e r the order is "final," is a question 
4\** Therefore, the appellate court will re-
the trial court's decision on this point for 
,r*ctness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax 
;£m'n, 814 P.2d 1099 U991). 
_a«parate c laims. 
When the degree of factual overlap between 
.-* i*«ue certified for appeal and the issues re-
naming in the trial court is such that separate 
,*im* appear to be based on the same opera-
te facts or on the same operative facts with 
Juoor variations, they are not separate claims 
JC purposes of Subdivision tb). Kennecott 
\*p. v. State Tax Coramn, 814 P.2d 1099 
•i91); FMA Leasing Co. v. Citizens Bank. 823 
r»2d 1065 (Utah 1992). 
To be eligible as an appealable order under 
subdivision ib), the courts ruling must dispose 
u "separate claim." A "separate claim" must 
irue from different facts than those underly-
r»* the remaining causes of action. Webb v. 
Vantage Income Properties, 818 P.2d 1 (1991). 
Plaintiffs alleged three causes of action, all 
4 which arose out of the same set of operative 
'4Cta, constituted only one "claim" for purposes 
i this rule. Furniture Distribution Ctr. v. 
Milea, 821 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1991). 
A claim is not separate if a decision on 
Uima remaining in the trial court would ren-
!«T moot the issues on appeal. Bennion v. 
^nnzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 1992). 
Pursuant to the requirement of U.R.C.P. 
r
'2(a) that the trial court "find the facts spe-
:aliy," in order to facilitate appellate review of 
»judgment certified as final under Subdivision 
y of this rule, the trial court should enter 
endings supporting its determination that 
*uch an order is final and the findings should 
M
*plain the lack of factual overlap between the 
*rtified and remaining claims. Bennion v. 
'>nnzoil Co., 826 P.2d 137 (Utah 1992). 
Where the substance of plaintiffs lawsuit 
*aa that defendant defamed him several times, 
•*ach alleged defamation was a separate injury 
•nving rise to a separate and distinct claim: the 
r
**Hution of a given libel claim arising from 
>ne statement would not have a res judicata 
*nect on other libel claims arising from other 
statements and therefore such claims could be 
severed from the claim remaining before the 
trial court. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 835 
^•2d 179 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
l DrvP s i s t e n t oral statements-
^rol statements of opinion by the trial court 
:-> i 
inconsistent .vith lh»- lit, iinu.- m i . •« «f vi u- n i»is 
ultimately renrjerrd <io not .ifteri «rw final 
judgment. MeCollum v. ( lothier . 121 Utah 
311. 241 P2d 4tfh . 1!>52J. 
In te res t on j udgmen t . 
Interest follows a judgment -L> a .-nailer ot 
law and is collectible even thouuh the clerk of 
court fails to include the same in the judgment 
signed by him. Dairy Distnbs.. Inc. v. Local 
976. Western ('oiiference of Teamsters, hi 
Utah 2d 85. :J9H P 2d 47 (1964). 
In an action on an oral contract, a party's 
failure to specifically plead a request for pre-
judgment interest was of no consequence be-
cause the interest issue is injected by law into 
every action for the payment of past due 
monev. Fitzgerald v. Critchtield, 744 P.2d 301 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
When a judgment is reversed on appeal, the 
new judgment subsequently entered by the 
trial court may bear interest only from the 
date of entry of that new judgment. Mason v. 
Western Mtg. Loan Corp., 754 P.2d 984 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
J u d g m e n t based on u n p l e a d e d theory . 
Where plaintiff alleged only an express con-
tract and he sought no amendment of his 
pleadings nor offered any proof to establish a 
quantum meruit theory, court erred in grant-
ing judgment for plaintiff based on the theory 
of quantum meruit. Taylor v. E.M. Rovle Corp., 
1 Utah 2d 175, 264 P.2d 279 Q953). 
Although a complaint may sound in con-
tract, it is not prejudicial error for a court to 
allow recovery on the basis of quantum meruit, 
where defendant was not denied a fair opportu-
nity to meet the change in theory of recovery. 
PLC Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish 'n 
Chips, Inc.. 28 Utah 2d 350. 502 P.2d 562 
(1972). 
Complaint for foreclosure of a lien was defec-
tive because of the nature of relief sought even 
though it did not demand judgment for per-
sonal liability on contract and judgment was 
granted for such personal liability, since this 
rule provides that a judgment shall grant the 
relief to which a party is entitled even though 
it is not demanded. Motivated Mert. Int'l v. 
Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979). 
In a dispute over the appropriation of assets 
and goodwill of a business corporation, it was 
error for trial court to liquidate assets of the 
corporation where the issues upon which such 
action rested were neither pleaded nor raised 
by parties, nor tried. Combe v. War rens Fam-
ily Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). 
J u d g m e n t in favor of n o n p a r t y . 
Subdivision (cnl) is consistent with the gen-
eral principle that a trial court may not render 
judgment in favor of a nonparty. Courts can 
generally make a legally binding adjudication 
only between the parties actually joined in the 
action. Hiltslev v. Rvder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 
1987). 
Subdivision (c)(1) cannot dispense entirely 
with the necessity that a claimant make some 
claim in the lawsuit against the defendant. 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987). 
A court may not grant relief to a nonparty. 
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A.L.R. — Attorney's personal liability for 
expenses incurred in relation to services for cli-
ent, 15 A.L.R.3d 531; 66 A.L.R.4th 256. 
Effect on compensation of architect or build-
ing contractor of express provision in private 
building contract limiting the cost of the build-
ing, 20 A.L.R.3d 778. 
Recoverability under property insurance or 
insurance against liability for property dam-
age of insureds expenses to prevent or miti-
gate damages. 33 A.L.R.3d 1262. 
Dismissal of plaintiffs action as entitling de-
fendant to recover attorney's fees or costs as 
"prevailing party" or "successful party," 66 
A.L.R.3d 1087. 
Who is the "successful party" or "prevailing 
party" for purposes of awarding costs where 
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66 
A.L.R.3d 1115. 
Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses 
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
Rule 55. Default. 
Running of interest on judgment where both 
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099. 
Allocation of defense costs between primary 
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th 
107. 
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or 
other sanctions against attorney who fails to 
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial. 29 
A.L.R.4th 160. 
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus 
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457. 
Retrospective application and effect of state 
statute or rule allowing interest or changing 
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41 
A.L.R.4th 694. 
Obduracy as basis for state-court award of 
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
Modern status of state court rules governing 
entry of judgment on multiple cairns, 80 
A.L.R.4th 707. 
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal 
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d), 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R. 
Fed. 168. 
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure 
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on 
multiple claims. 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error <$= 24 to 
135; Costs <5=» 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq.; 
Judgment <s=> 1. 
(a) Default. 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative 
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by 
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his 
default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any 
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be neces-
sary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken 
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule 
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the 
nondefaulting party. 
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J u d g m e n t . 
Judgments by default are not tavored by the 
courts nor are thev in the interest of justice 
and fair play. Heathman v Fabian & 
Clendenin. 14 Utah 2d m. All P.2d 189 < 1962). 
—Conduct of counse l . 
When defendant's counsel was 27 minutes 
late on morning trial was commenced because 
he was unable to obtain from the Supreme 
Court a writ of prohibition to prevent the hold-
ing of the trial on that day due to absence of 
defense witnesses, the trial court erred in 
granting a default judgment to plaintiff and 
refusing to allow defense counsel to participate 
in the proceedings or challenge plaintiffs evi-
dence, notwithstanding any ill-advised, irritat-
ing or contemptuous conduct from defense 
counsel during the action, since the law prefers 
that a case be tried on its merits and the par-
ties litigant should not be made to suffer for 
the misconduct of their counsel. McKean v. 
Mountain View Mem. Estates, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 
323, 411 P.2d 129 (1966). 
Default e n t r y neces sa ry . 
No default judgment may be entered under 
Subdivision (b)(2) unless default has previ-
ously been entered. The entry of default is an 
essential predicate to any default judgment. P 
& B Land, Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
—Failure to follow rule. 
Rule 54(c>(2) and this rule prescribe the pro-
cedure to be followed by trial courts in entering 
judgments against defaulting parties, and 
courts are not at liberty to deviate from those 
rules just because one party is in default and is 
not entitled to be heard on the merits of the 
case. Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1984). 
Judgment against defaulting party must be 
reversed where plaintiffs' claims for damages 
were not for sums certain and a hearing was 
not conducted by the trial court to ascertain 
the amount of damages to which the plaintiffs 
were entitled. Russell v. Martell. 681 P.2d 
1193 (Utah 1984). 
The entry of a default judgment by a court 
with jurisdiction over the parties and the sub-
ject matter, where there is no default in law or 
in fact, is improper and voidable. P & B Land, 
Inc. v. Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
—Hearing on merits. 
No one has an inalienable or constitutional 
right to a judgment by default without a hear-
ing on the merits. The courts, in the interest of 
justice and fair play, favor, where possible, a 
full and complete opportunity for a hearing on 
the merits of every case. Heathman v. Fabian, 
14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962). 
—Punitive d a m a g e s . 
Lower court's award of punitive damages 
without proof and upon default judgment was 
in and of itself justification for vacating judg-
ment. Securitv Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. 
West, 20 Utah 2d 292. 437 P.2d 214 (1968). 
Notice. 
This rule provides that a party in default 
ne
«d not be given notice of the entry of default 
judgment. Central Bank & Trust Co. v Jensen, 
656 P.2d 1009 (Utah 1982L 
Set t ing as ide defaul t . 
An entry of default may be set aside under 
this rule for good cause shown by the court; 
once a judgment by default has been entered, 
however, it may be set aside only in accordance 
with Rule 60(b). Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson, 
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982>. 
Once a default judgment has been entered, it 
can only be set aside in accordance with Rule 
60(b). Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
—Collateral attack. 
Where affidavit for publication of summons 
presented no evidentiary facts, a default judg-
ment entered against the defendant could be 
attacked collaterally. Bowen v. Olson, 122 
Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
Where affidavit for publication of summons 
contained some evidence upon which the order 
for publication of summons could reasonably 
be based, a default judgment against the defen-
dant could not be attacked collaterally, even if 
the evidence was insufficient to persuade the 
judge or clerk of the necessarv facts. Bowen v. 
Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
—Direct attack. 
An action brought to vacate a default judg-
ment on ground that service of summons by 
publication was obtained by fraud is a direct 
and not a collateral attack. Bowen v. Olson, 
122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 (1952). 
—Discretion of court. 
A trial court is endowed with considerable 
latitude of discretion in granting or denying a 
motion to set a default judgment aside. Board 
of Educ. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 
(1963). 
Where plaintiff sought relief from a default 
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) on three occa-
sions before three different judges and his mo-
tions were denied in the first two proceedings, 
the third judge was barred by the law of the 
case from overruling the previous orders. 
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987). 
—Grounds. 
E x c u s a b l e neglect . 
A default certificate may be set aside upon 
grounds of excusable neglect. Heathman v. 
Fabian, 14 Utah 2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962). 
While reliance on an attorney's assurances 
that one's rights are being protected could, in 
the appropriate circumstances, be seen as ex-
cusable neglect, trial court properly refused to 
excuse the neglect of a defendant who failed to 
establish that she was so represented. Miller v. 
Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
—Judicial attitude. 
Where any reasonable excuse is offered by 
defaulting party, courts generally tend to favor 
granting relief from a default judgment, unless 
to do so would result in substantial prejudice or 
injustice to the adverse party. Westinghouse 
Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 
544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). 
—Movant's duty. 
Party who seeks to have a default judgment 
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(4) Newly discovered evi(ience, material for the partv making the ap-
plication, which he could not. with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served mav be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 59. F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion 
for new trial, $ 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial. 
Rule 61. 
ANALYSIS 
Abandonment of motion. 
Accident or surprise. 
Arbitration awards. 
Caption on motion for new trial. 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict. 
Correction of record. 
Costs. 
Decision against law. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Effect of order granting new trial. 
Effect of untimely motion. 
Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. 
Excessive or inadequate damages. 
—Punitive damages. 
Failure to object to findings of fact. 
Filing of affidavits. 
Grounds for new trial. 
—Particularization in motion. 
Incompetence or negligence of counsel. 
Misconduct of jury. 
Motion to alter or amend judgment. 
Motion to be presented to trial court. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
New trial on initiative of court. 
Procedure for questioning grant of new trial. 
Reconsideration of motion for new trial. 
Settlement bars appeal. 
Summary judgment. 
Time for motion. 
Tolling time for appeal. 
Waiver. 
Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
of verdict or indictment. Rules of Evidence, 
Rule 606. 
Cited. 
Abandonment of motion. 
Abandonment of motion for new trial must 
be intentional, and the facts must indicate this 
intention. Bailey v. Sound Lab. Inc., 694 P.2d 
1043 (Utah 1984). 
Accident or surprise. 
This section requires that the moving party 
show that ordinary prudence was exercised to 
guard against the accident or surprise. Powers 
v. Gene's Bldg. Materials. Inc.. 567 P.2d 174 
(Utah 1977). 
Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial on 
the basis of surprise concerning testimony of 
the defendant's expert witness where the 
plaintiff failed to object to the testimony either 
before, or immediately after, it was given. 
Jensen v. Thomas. 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977>. 
A ' 'surprise" at trial which could have been 
easily guarded against by utilization of avail-
able discovery procedures may not serve as a 
ground for a new trial under Subdivison 'an.J). 
Anderson v. Bradley. 590 P.2d ;$:J9 (Utah 
1979). 
Failure to interpose a timely objection to tes-
timony challenged on the ground of surprise 
would be a sufficient reason to deny a motion 
for a new trial on that ground. Chournos v. 
D'Agmllo. 642 P.2d 710 (Utah 1982). 
Claim of error based on accident or surprise, 
never brought to the attention ot the trial court 
by objection, motion to strike, motion for a new 
trial, or otherwise, was asserted for the first 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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is well established. This discretion is necessary 
to allow the court an opportunity to cause reex-
amination or correction of jury verdicts or find-
ings which it believes to be in error, or where 
there is substantial doubt that the issues were 
fairly tried. Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co.. 
15 Utah 2d 257. 391 P.2d 290 (1964). 
Granting of a plaintiffs motion for a new 
trial after a jury verdict for the defendant in a 
rear-end collision case was not an abuse of dis-
cretion on the theory that the verdict for the 
plaintiff at the second trial showed conclu-
sively that there were jury questions and that 
the motion therefore should have been denied 
after an errorless first trial. Brown v. Johnson. 
24 Utah 2d 388, 472 P.2d 942 (1970). 
A ruling on a motion for a new trial will not 
be disturbed on appeal except when there is a 
clear abuse of the court's discretion. Jensen v. 
Thomas. 570 P.2d 695 (Utah 1977); Lembach v. 
Cox, 639 P.2d 197 (Utah 1981), overruled in 
part on other grounds, Pusey v. Pusey, 728 
P.2d 117 (Utah 1986). 
On review of a trial court's denial of a motion 
for a new trial alleging an excessive jury 
award, the Supreme Court's function is limited 
to a determination of whether the trial court's 
denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion. 
Batty v. Mitchell. 575 P.2d 1040 (Utah 1978). 
Orders granting or denying motions for a 
new trial will not be reversed by the Supreme 
Court unless there has been a manifest abuse 
of discretion. Schmidt v. Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc.. 635 P.2d 99 (Utah 1981). 
Both the granting of, and the refusal to 
grant, a new trial is a matter left to the discre-
tion of the trial judge, and the decision will be 
reversed only if the judge has abused that dis-
cretion by acting unreasonably. Christenson v. 
Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1365 (Utah 1988). 
A trial court has no discretion to grant a new 
trial absent a showing of at least one of the 
circumstances specified in Subdivision ta). 
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W. 
Constructors. Inc., 765 P.2d 125 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The trial court has broad discretion to grant 
or deny a motion for a new trial. Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch.. 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
Effect of order granting new trial. 
An order granting a new trial is not a final 
judgment; it only sets aside the verdict and 
places the parties in the same position as if 
there had been no previous trial. Haslam v. 
Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P 2d 736 (1964). 
Effect of untimely motion. 
When an untimely motion for a new trial is 
made, the trial court's only alternative is to 
deny the motion; an untimely motion for a new 
trial has, however, no effect on the running of 
the time for filing a notice of appeal. Burgers v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982). 
Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. 
In an action for injuries to a child who was 
struck by the defendant's automobile, evidence 
relating to the time when the defendant saw 
the child and to his precautions to avoid the 
child was ample to support a verdict for the 
child: and. therefore, it was proper to grant a 
new trial on the ground that the evidence was 
insufficient to justify a verdict of no cause of 
action. Holmes v. Nelson. 7 Utah 2d 435, 326 
P.2d 722 M<»58). 
Where a verdict is not justifiable under the 
evidence, the remedy is to order modification of 
the verdict and the adverse party is given the 
choice of accepting it or taking a new trial; this 
alternative does not infringe upon right to trial 
by jury. Bodon v. Suhrmann. N ( ' tan 2d 42. 327 
P.2d 826 il95Hi. 
Where there are divergent elements of com-
petent evidence before the jury, its findings 
based on its belief as to which preponderates 
will be respected on appeal; however, the ver-
dict must be supported by some competent evi-
dence. Weber Basin Water Conservancv Dist. 
v. Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79. 328 P.2d 730 (1958). 
Trial court did not abuse its discretionary 
power in refusing a new trial on the ground of 
insufficient evidence to support the verdict 
where reasonable men could draw different 
conclusions from conflicting evidence. 
Pollesche v. Transamerican Ins. Co., 27 Utah 
2d 430, 497 P.2d 236 (1972). 
Where the trial court has denied a motion for 
new trial claiming insufficiency of the evidence 
to support the verdict, its decision will be sus-
tained on appeal if there was an evidentiary 
basis for the jury's decision and will be re-
versed only if the evidence to support the ver-
dict was completely lacking or was so slight 
and unconvincing as to make the verdict 
plainly unreasonable and unjust. Nelson v. 
Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 (Utah 1982); Eerbert & 
Jaynes v. R.C. Tolman Constr. Co., 680 P.2d 
746 (Utah 1984). 
Where the trial court has granted a new trial 
motion based on insufficiency of evidence, its 
decisions will be sustained on appeal if the 
record contains substantial competent evi-
dence which would support a verdict for the 
moving party. Nelson v. Trujillo. 657 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1982)"; Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 
530 'Utah 1984). 
In breach of contract action against a con-
struction company, based upon allegedly defec-
tive workmanship in drilling a well, there was 
an evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling 
in the defendant's favor where a videotape of 
the well site and expert testimony indicated 
that there was no proof of defective workman-
ship, and that problems with the well could 
have been caused by factors outside of the de-
fendant's control. Egbert & Javnes v. R.C. 
Tolman Constr. Co.. 680 P.2d 746 (Utah 1984). 
When a new trial is granted based on the 
weight of the evidence, the standard for re-
viewing the trial court's ruling is much nar-
rower than the trial court s standard in grant-
ing the new trial. Goddard v. Hickman. 685 
P.2d 530 .Utah 1984). 
The decision of the trial court to grant a new 
trial will not be disturbed on appeal when the 
record contains substantial competent evi-
dence which would support a verdict in favor of 
the moving party. This substantial evidence 
standard requires that the evidence be suffi-
cient in amount and credibility that, when con-
sidered in connection with the other evidence 
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punitive d a m a g e s . 
"~Any motion for a new trial on the question ot 
Hve damages requires that the tna i court 
^ ^ g e in a two-part inquiry: m whether puni-
2-
 a r e appropriate at all. i.e.. whether the 
UV,dence is sufficient to support a lawful jury 
finding of defendant's requisite mental state; 
\ u i (ii) whether the amount of punitives is ex-
^ i v e or inadequate, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or preju-djce. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 
(Utah 1991). 
If the ratio of punitive to actual damages 
falls within the range that the Supreme Court 
has consistently upheld, then the trial court 
may assume that the award is not excessive. In 
denying a Subdivision (a)(5) motion for a new 
trial, the trial court need not give any detailed 
explanation for its decision if the punitive 
damage award falls within this ratio range. If 
the award exceeds the ratios set by the past 
pattern of decision, the trial court is not bound 
to reduce it. However, if such an award is up-
held, the trial judge must make a detailed and 
reasoned articulation of the grounds for con-
cluding that the award is not excessive in light 
of the law and the facts. Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
The general rule appears to be that where 
the punitives are well below $100,000, puni-
tive damage awards beyond a 3 to 1 ratio to 
actual damages have seldom been upheld by 
the Supreme Court and that where the award 
is in excess of $100,000, the court has indicated 
some inclination to overturn awards having ra-
tios of less than 3 to 1. Crookston v. Fire Ins. 
Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
Failure to object to f indings of fact. 
The failure to object to the findings of fact, in 
the form of a motion for a new trial or amend-
ment of judgment, was not fatal to the defen-
dants' appeal from a proceeding in equity. 
Dugan v. Jones. 724 P.2d 955 (Utah 1986). 
Filing of affidavits. 
Motion for new trial on grounds of newly dis-
covered evidence was properly denied by the 
lower court where movant did not comply with 
Subdivision (c) in timely filing an affidavit. 
Thorley v. Kolob Fish & G a m e Club, 13 Utah 
2d 294, 373 P.2d 574 (1962). 
Grounds for n e w t r ia l . 
In passing on a motion for a new trial, if the 
trial court cannot reasonably find that the jury 
erred, it should deny the motion. On the other 
hand, if the trial court can reasonably conclude 
that there was insufficient evidence to justify 
the verdict or it is manifestly against the 
weight of the evidence in violation of Subdivi-
sion (a)(6) or that the jury acted with passion 
or prejudice contrary to Subdivision (a)(5), it 
may grant the motion and order a new trial. 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 
'Utah 1991). 
A motion for a new trial challenging the 
amount of a punitive damage award is most 
appropriately brought under Subdivision 
fa)(5), while a motion challenging an award of 
hard actual damages is more appropriately 
brought under Subdivision (a)(6). Crookston v. 
Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991). 
— Par t i cu la r izu t ion in motion. 
The onlv purpose tor requiring yarticulanza-
tion of grounds upon which a motion tor new 
trial is made is to inform the court and the 
other party of the theories upon which the new 
trial is sought, and where defendant filed an 
affidavit with his motions setting forth his the-
ories and where the judgment was on the 
pleadings in the original case the court and 
parties were sufficiently advised as to the 
grounds for the motion. Howard /. Howard, LI 
Utah 2d 149. 356 P.2d 275 (I960). 
Arguments that affidavits and unpublished 
depositions "clearly establish the injustice that 
will be accomplished if said summary judg-
ment is allowed to stand" and that the grant-
ing of the motion would be "in the interest of 
judicial economy and efficiency"' did not consti-
tute a "showing" of any of the circumstances 
specified by the provisions of Subdivision (a). 
Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasystems W. 
Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 i Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
I ncompe tence o r neg l igence of counse l . 
While the general rule is that in civil cases a 
new trial will not be granted based upon the 
incompetence or negligence of ones own trial 
counsel, there are cases which recognize that 
under exigent or exceptional circumstances 
which appear to have resulted in an injustice, 
the court may be justified in granting a new 
trial; however, mere differences in the theory 
of trial techniques are not sufficient to warrant 
a new trial on the basis of incompetence or neg-
ligence of trial counsel. Jennings v. Stoker, 652 
P.2d 912 (Utah 1982). 
Misconduct of jury. 
Claim of misconduct of the jury based upon 
affidavits of jurors that one of their number 
had performed an independent test at the scene 
of the injury in question and that such test 
influenced the decision of such juror did not 
meet the requirements for jury misconduct set 
out bv this rule. Smith v. Barnett, 17 Utah 2d 
240. 408 P.2d 709 (1965). 
Although Subdivision (a)(2) allows for a new 
trial on the grounds of misconduct of the jury, 
with very limited exceptions, the conduct and 
deliberations in the jury room cannot be im-
peached, as it would be impracticable and lead 
to endless mischief to examine into the discus-
sions and deliberations of the iurv. Hathawav 
v. Marx. 21 Utah 2d 33, 439 P.2d 850 (1968). 
Affidavits of five jurors which tended to show 
that the jury misconstrued and misunderstood 
the instructions were not sufficient grounds for 
a new trial since affidavits had to be based on 
the misconduct specified in Subdivision (a)(2), 
and jurors cannot impeach their verdict by 
what was said or done in the jury room. 
Stringham v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425 (Utah 
1974); Deats v. Commercial Sec. Bank. 746 
P.2d 1191 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), cert, denied, 
765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988). 
Affidavits from jurors which would indicate 
that the jury was confused as :o the applicable 
law as enunciated by the court in its instruc-
tions or that they disregarded the law in arriv-
ing at a verdict would not substantiate a claim 
of misconduct within the meaning of Subdivi-
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the time of trial. In re Disconnection of ( Vrtain 
Territory, 66* P.2d 544 <l'tah 1983>. 
Party was not entitled to a new trial based 
on newly discovered evidence that could not 
have been discovered and produced at trial. 
where the new evidence was merely cumula-
tive to that elicited at trial with no new find-
ings apparent so that there was no likelihood 
that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different if this evidence had been available. 
Barson ex rel. Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984 >. 
Newly discovered evidence must be material, 
competent evidence which is in fact newly dis-
covered. Secondly, it must be such that it could 
not, by due diligence, have been discovered and 
produced at trial. Finally, it must not be 
merely cumulative or incidental, but must be 
ofsufficient substance that there is reasonable 
likelihood that with it there would have been a 
different result. In re S.R.. 735 P.2d 53 (Utah 
1987). 
Where, in post-judgment motions, the appel-
lant claimed to have the articles of incorpora-
tion, the certificate of incorporation, minutes of 
the organizational meeting, checkbook records, 
stock transfers, and agreements between dif-
ferent companies available to prove his claim, 
it was held difficult to see how any of this could 
constitute "newly discovered evidence" as he 
claimed, particularly in view of his having 
signed five and six-year-old corporate minutes 
the day prior to trial. Walker v. Carlson, 740 
P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Newly discovered evidence must relate to 
facts in existence at the time of trial and can-
not be based upon facts occurring after trial. 
Hancock v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183 
(Utah 1990). 
A deed executed after trial and thus not in 
existence at the time of trial is not newly dis-
covered evidence. Hancock v. Planned Dev. 
Corp., 791 P.2d 183 (Utah 1990). 
New trial on initiative of court. 
The 10-day time period in Subdivision (d) 
cannot be enlarged. Boskovich v. Utah Constr. 
Co., 123 Utah 387. 259 P.2d 885 (1953). 
Requirement that trial court shall specify 
the grounds therefor when ordering a new trial 
of its own initiative is satisfied by specifying 
the general grounds provided in the Rules of 
Civil Procedure; such order need not be sup-
ported by detailed findings of fact. Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984). 
Procedure for questioning grant of new 
trial. 
If a trial court's authority with respect to a 
motion for a new trial is exercised arbitrarily, 
the proper redress is either in a petition for 
interlocutory appeal, which may be granted in 
a proper case, or in the preservation of error for 
review, if necessary, upon the final outcome of 
the case. Haslam v. Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 
389 P.2d 736 (1964). 
Reconsideration of motion for new trial. 
The Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide 
for a motion for the trial court to reconsider or 
review its ruling granting or denying a motion 
f°r a new trial, and where the trial court 
granted a motion for a new trial in a negli-
^L-nce action pursuant to regular procedure, 
and no inadvertence, mistake, nr irregularity 
appeared (Rule 601 in connection with the ob-
taining of the order, the court had not author-
ity to entertain and grant a motion ro recon-
sider or review its ruling. Drurv v Luneeford, 
18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662 i 196B>. 
Set t lement b a r s appea l . 
Settlement of default judgment bv parties' 
California counsel barred appeal from denial of 
motion under this rule, ('live v. Mason, 605 
P.2d 7H:i (Utah 198()>. 
Summary judgment. 
A motion for a "new'' trial following sum-
mary judgment is procedurally correct and 
available to litigants. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n v. 
Ultrasystems W Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 
125 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Interstate Land 
Corp. v. Patterson, 797 P.2d 1101 'Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
Time for motion. 
Rule 60(b) may not be used to extend the 
time in which a motion may be filed pursuant 
to this rule. Goddard v. Bundv. 121 Utah 299, 
241 P.2d 462 (1952). 
A court may not enter a nunc pro tunc pre-
dating a motion for a new triai that is untimely 
filed so that the motion will be timelv. Kettner 
v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962). 
Pursuant to Rule 5(d), which allows the fil-
ing of any paper after the complaint required 
to be served upon a party withm a reasonable 
time after service, a motion filed with the court 
two days after service is timely. Dehm v. 
Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah 1976). 
Tolling time for appeal. 
A timely motion under this rule terminates 
the running of the time for appeal of a judg-
ment, and time for appeal does not begin to run 
again until the order granting or denying such 
a motion is entered. Hume v. Small Claims 
Court, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979); Interstate 
Land Corp. v. Patterson. 797 P.2d 1101 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. The time for 
appeal from a judgment, toiled by a party's 
timely post-judgment motion, starts to run on 
the date when the trial court enters its signed 
order, denving the motion. Gallardo v. 
Boiinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Waiver. 
Where the verdict made no award of general 
damages and was deficient in form, plaintiffs 
failure to demand that the jury be sent back for 
further deliberations, and her failure to object 
to the verdict at a bench conference regarding 
the correctness of the verdict constituted 
waiver of her ngh^ to a new trial or to appeal 
the verdict. Conn v. J.C. Penney Co.. 537 P.2d 
306 (1975). 
Where a special verdict failed to mention 
damages in regard to one part of a cause of 
action but the plaintiff failed to raise this in-
sufficiency before the jury was discharged, the 
issue was deemed waived and could not be 
raised in a motion for new trial. Ute-Cai Land 
Dev. Corp. v. Sather, 605 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980). 
U T A H R U L E S OK CIVIL f»K< H 'EIM'KK Rule HO 
171 
for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
** *LA Don the defendant as required by Rule l'e» and the defendant has 
*
efwTto appear in said action; i5) the judgment is void: <6> the judgment has 
fa ilea ^ ^ released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
__ J «.i . . „ j . ^ | t j s n o | o n i r e r equitable that 
anv other reason 
be*n «pA has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
*^Tiudgment should have prospective application: or <7 
fving relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
j
 h'n a reasonable time and for reasons 11), '2), I.'JK or '4>, not more than 3 
'** ths after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
n
°tion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
m
 oend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
f ^ n a n independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
dding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
htaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
niles or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References . 
....
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Fee tor filing motion 
21-1-5. 
ANALYSIS 
Any other reason justifying relief." 
tkfault judgment. 
Impossibility of compliance with order. 
Incompetent counsel. 
I j c k of due process. 
Merits of case. 
Mistake or inadvertence. 
Real party in interest. 
\ppeals. 
« lyrical mistakes. 
Computation of damages. 
Correction after appeal. 
-Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
Katate record. 
Inherent power of courts. 
Intent of court and parties. 
Judicial error distinguished. 
Order prepared by counsel. 
Predating of new trial motion. 
Court's discretion. 
rVfault judgment. 
.'Tect of set-aside judgment. 
Admissions. 
Kraud. 
-Divorce action. 
Korm of motion, 
independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
-Divorce decree. 
-Fraud or duress. 
- Motion distinguished, 
invalid summons. 
-Amendment without notice, 
inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
•mtake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
3«fault judgment. 
Illness. 
——Inconvenience. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
^Delayed motion for new trial. 
-Fai lure to file cost bill. 
—Failure to file notice of appeal. 
—Nonreceipt of notice and findings. 
—Trial court's discretion. 
—Unemployment compensation appeal. 
—Workmen's compensation appeal. 
Newly discovered evidence. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Discretion not abused. 
Procedure. 
—Notice to parties. 
Res judicata. 
Reversal of judgment. 
—Invalidation of sale. 
Satisfaction, release or discharge. 
—Accord and satisfaction. 
—Discharging representative of estate from 
further demand. 
—Erroneously included damages. 
—Prospective application of judgment. 
Timeliness of motion. 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
—Fraud. 
—Invalid service. 
—Judicial error. 
—Jurisdiction. 
—Mistake, inadvertence and neglect. 
—Newly discovered evidence. 
—Order entered upon erroneous assumption. 
—"Reasonable time." 
—Reconsideration of previously denied motion. 
—Satisfaction. 
Unauthorized appearance. 
Void judgment. 
—Basis. 
—Lack of jurisdiction. 
Cited. 
"Any o the r r ea son just i fying relief." 
Subdivision (7) embodies three require-
ments: First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in Subdivisions (1) through (6); sec-
ond, that the reason justify relief: and third, 
that the motion be made within a reasonable 
time. Laub v South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 
P.2d 1304 tUtah 1982V. Richins v. Delbert 
Chipman & Sons. 817 P.2d 382 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
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pndered. trial * our t ,s denial uf defendant's mo-
r on to set aside detault judgment on grounds 
laintirt'Wfh not the real partv m interest, un-
der Subdivision «hn7» of this rule, was sup-
norted bv evidence that plaintitT was the real 
l^j-ty in interest and that defendant had 
knowledge thereof. Robinson v. Myers. 599 
p.2d 513 (Utah 1979). 
Appeals. 
&n order denying relief under Subdivision 
,b) is a final appeaiable order. Moreover, im-
nroper or untimely motions do not toll the time 
for appeal from final orders. Arnica Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Schettier. 768 P.2d 950 I Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages . 
Where damage award was based on the sum 
of four separate amounts listed in a letter ex-
hibit, and the sum of the amounts was in error, 
the error was within the definition of a clerical 
mistake and was subject to correction by the 
trial court. Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. 
Co., 669 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983). 
—Correction after appeal. 
Trial court may correct clerical error made 
in recording of decree after Supreme Court has 
affirmed erroneous decree on appeal. Bagnali 
v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 917 (Utah 
1978). 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
Where later judgment was void and different 
from earlier valid judgment, no appeal could be 
taken on ground that defendants were appeal-
ing from the earlier judgment and that inser-
tion of date of void judgment was merely a cler-
ical error which court could correct. Nunley v. 
Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 Utah 2d 126, 
388 P.2d 798 (1964). 
—Estate record. 
The correction of the record in an estate is 
properly made in the probate court in which 
the errors occurred, and the court was justified 
in accepting parol evidence as to the incorrect-
ness of the record. Harmston v. Harmston, 5 
Utah 2d 357, 302 P.2d 270 (1956). 
—Inherent power of courts. 
The courts of this state had recognized the 
inherent right of a court to enter a judgment 
nunc pro tunc to correct clerical errors. Frost v. 
District Court ex rel. Box Elder County, 96 
Utah 106, 83 P.2d 737 (1938). 
—Intent of court and parties. 
The correction contemplated by Subdivision 
'a> of this rule must be undertaken for the pur-
pose of reflecting the actual intention of the 
court and parties. Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 
401 (Utah 1984). 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
The distinction between a judicial error and 
a
 clerical error does not depend upon who made 
lU rather, it depends on whether it was made 
»n rendering the judgment (judicial error) or in 
recording the judgment as rendered (clerical 
error>. Richards v. Siddowav, 24 Utah 2d 314, 
4 7
* P-2d 143 (1970). 
Question of whether an error is "judicial" or 
"clerical" depends not on v. ho made it. hul on 
vvhether it was made in rendering the judg-
ment or in recording the judgment. Lindsay \ . 
Atkin, *>S0 P.LM 101 (Utah I'JMi. 
—Order p r e p a r e d by counse l . 
Krroneous assumption by judge in signing 
order that the order as prepared bv counsel cor-
rectly reflected his judgment was a mistake of 
a perfunctorv or clerical nature which the 
court could and properly did correct upon Hs 
own motion. Meagher v. Lquitv Oil Co., 5 Utah 
lid l(J6. 299 P2d 827 < I9n6i." 
— P r e d a t i n g of new tr ia l motion. 
A court may not enter a nunc pro tunc pre-
dating a motion for new trial that is untimely 
filed so that the motion will he timelv. Kettner 
v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962). 
Court's discretion. 
The trial court is afforded broad discretion in 
ruling on a motion for relief from judgment 
under Subdivision <bi, and its determination 
will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discre-
tion. Birch v. Birch. 771 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Default judgment. 
Once a default judgment has been entered, it 
can only be set aside in accordance with Subdi-
vision ib). Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettier. 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Effect of set-aside judgment. 
—Admissions. 
Subdivision (bi does not provide tha t as part 
of the order setting aside a judgment any ad-
missions are also set aside: those matters are 
covered exclusively by a motion made as pro-
vided by Rule 36(b). Whitaker v. Nikols, 699 
P.2d 685 (Utah 1985). 
Fraud. 
—Divorce action. 
Motion to set aside provisions of divorce de-
cree concerning child custody and support 
based upon allegation that wife had perpetu-
ated a fraud upon the court by falsely claiming 
husband was child's father did not comply with 
Subdivision (b) and should have been denied. 
McGavin v. McGavin, 27 Utah 2d 200, 494 
P.2d 283 (1972). 
The wife in a divorce action was entitled to 
have the decree set aside on the ground of 
fraud where the assets of the parties may have 
been more than five times the amount dis-
closed by the husband who prevented the wife 
from gaining full and accurate knowledge of 
his total assets by transferring his corporate 
holdings to family members without relin-
quishing control of those assets, by 
understating the true value of jointly held 
property, and by avoiding compliance with 
court-ordered discovery. Bovce v. Bovce. 609 
P.2d 928 (Utah 1980)' 
Form of motion. 
Trial court did not err in vacating judgment 
in response to defendants' supplemental state-
ment of objections, which, though clearly mis-
labeled, was the functional equivalent of a mo-
tion to set aside the judgment under Subdivi-
sion (b), was filed in contemplation of the rule, 
contained the same kinds of arguments and as-
sertions one would normally expect to find in a 
UTAH Kl LKS < >F CIVIL I'ROCKIH KK Rule 60 
w set aside default judgment .»n 
_ . "* excusable neglect was not error 
^ • • • J f e n d a n t failed to contact his counsel 
• ^ ^ b r u a r y to time of trial in September. 
*•?Jltasel did not attempt to contact deten-
^ ^ t i l ten days before trial even though 
ffjf K^ d long been informed of approximate 
rftrial notwithstanding claim that coun-
« • • * unable to contact defendant due to de-
#•« lone working hours and his custom of 
l » i v i * & . . f , 4 . u 
^ _ ^ his wife who was terminally ill with 
^ ^ A i r k e m Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 
• jrg i iT2d 65, 513 P.2d 429| U973). 
Urfion for relief from default judgment was 
\Z^\Y denied to cosigner (father) who 
J
^ P ^ i that his son was the proper defendant 
,
 U)0|c n 0 steps to file an answer to the com-
b a t . Pacer Sport & Cycle, Inc. v. Myers. 534 
? * | 616 (Utah 1975). 
\ trial court is justified in denying relief 
-fom a default judgment because of lack of 
,
 {Dm\y request, long passage of time before 
iaJung such request, general procedural ne-
*i«t, urgence of hypertechnicality about a 
Tutute, or an almost complete absence of sub-
UAUC* or merit in the relief for which he 
pr»yed. Heath v. Heath, 541 P.2d 1040 (Utah 
J75K 
Motion to set aside default judgment was 
properly denied in case where defendant of-
(fid no reasonable excuse for his nonappear-
ance failed to respond to repeated attempts to 
onuct him regarding status of the lawsuit he 
krww was pending, and knew that a hearing 
h*d been scheduled and that his counsel had 
withdrawn. Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 
I'Uh 1979). 
Where defendant claimed default judgment 
«*• due to his attorney's failure to communi-
cate with him, and the record showed that de-
fendant failed to contract his attorney for one 
*nd half years after he filed his answer and 
counterclaim, trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in denying defendant's motion to set 
*ude the default judgment. Gardiner & Gardi-
ner Bldrs. v. Swapp, 656 P.2d 429 (Utah 1982). 
In order for defendant to be relieved from a 
Wault judgment, he must not only show that 
the judgment was entered against him through 
*ny reason specified in Subdivision ib>. but he 
mint also show that his motion to set aside the 
judgment was timely, and that he has a meri-
torious defense to the action. A meritorious de-
frnae is one which sets forth specific and suffi-
ciently detailed facts which, if proven, would 
Have resulted in a judgment different from the 
one entered. State ex rel. Utah State Dep't of 
•^ arial Servs. v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 
'Utah 1983). 
Default judgment should not have been en-
ured in tort case arising out of injuries in-
ducted upon plaintiff by defendant where con-
tradictions surrounding adequacy of service of 
process and other factors resulted in genuine 
mistake on part of defendant, in the absence of 
*nich the default would not have occurred. 
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^eiault judgment was proper where state-
ments of defendant demonstrated indifference 
011
 nw part, and lack of diligence in pursuing 
his opportunity to detwid. KussHl v Martell. 
681 P 2d ll«J3 i Utah l!>X4i 
Neither the Utah Foreign -Judgment Act, 
$ 78-22a-l et seq.. nor this rule, permits a 
court to set aside a foreign default judgment 
because of alleged inadvertence, mistake, or 
neglect absent a showing of fraud or the lack of 
jurisdiction or due process in the rendering 
state. Data Mgt. Sys. v. FDP Corp.. 709 P.2d 
377 (Utah 1985). 
Failure to reserve rights under $ 70A-3-
606(l)<aJ. which governs impairment of re-
course or of collateral in regard to commercial 
paper and does not apply to judgments, could 
not be used to set aside default judgments 
against debtors under Subdivision tbM6) of this 
rule. First Sec. Bank v. Aarian Dev. Corp., 738 
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1987). 
Illness. 
Illness alone is not a sufficient excuse to 
make neglect in failing to defend a cause of 
action a ground for vacating a default judg-
ment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 
416. 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
Inconvenience. 
Mere inconvenience or the press of personal 
or business affairs is not deemed as an excuse 
for failure to appear at trial. Vallev Leasing v. 
Houghton. 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 1983). 
Merits of claim. 
Usually, it is not appropriate on Subdivision 
(b) motions to examine the merits of the claim 
decided bv the default judgment. Larsen v. 
Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
Negl igence of attorney. 
An oral promise made by the attorney for the 
plaintiff to the effect that defendant could have 
more time in which to answer, where the plain-
tiff already had obtained a default judgment, 
was now sufficient excusable neglect so as to 
allow the vacation of the default judgment. The 
defendants were deprived of nothing by the al-
leged promise inasmuch as tne default judg-
ment had already been entered. Such a prom-
ise could in no way bind a client who already 
had a judgment. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
Where defendant's counsel withdrew at pre-
trial conference and defendant claimed it re-
ceived no notice to appoint counsel and had no 
notice of trial until it received notice of default 
judgment, the default was set aside in the in-
terest of justice, the court stating that where 
there is doubt about whether a default should 
be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in 
favor of doing so. Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. 
Agla Dev. Corp.. 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980). 
Where plaintiffs attorney and insurance ad-
juster for defendant's insurance company were 
engaged in settlement talks at time plaintiffs 
petition was filed, defendant was entitled to 
relief from subsequent summary judgment on 
grounds of "excusable neglect'' since plaintiffs 
attorney had duty to notify adjuster of poten-
tial default and did not do so. Helgesen v. 
Inyangumia, 636 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1981). 
Party may not claim his attorney's neglect in 
failing to notify him of proceeding as grounds 
for setting aside a default judgment where the 
party has been negligent by not communicat-
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release or d i s cha rge . 
« niirchaser s m<>t } ? £ % P.*l *M 
Satisfaction, 
Accord and sat isfaction. 
4 judgment defendant is nut constrained to 
an alleged accord and satisfaction only as 
r
*
1ttfirmative defense to further attempts bv a 
J V m e n t creditor to enforce the terms of a 
A n i e n t . Rather, the i,„ue aia. he ra,M,i 
d ik ing direct judicial -auction «.l the satistac-
by motion or independent action pursuant 
.'^Subdivision «bn6i. Sugarhouse r m . ( o . v. 
Anderson, 610 P.2d 1369 (Utah 19*0,. 
When a judgment creditor accepted a prom-
v*orv note with greater consideration and dif-
•Vrent performance from the earlier judgment, 
*e released the judgment debtor from the judg-
ment in an accord and satisfaction. Brimley v. 
,;.i.~cr. 754 P.2d 97 .Utah Ut. App. 1988 > 
—Discharging r ep re sen t a t i ve of es ta te 
from further d e m a n d . 
Relief under this rule is available with re-
gard to an order under $ 75-3-1001 discharg-
ing a personal representative of an estate from 
further claim or demand after a final order has 
»*««*n entered. Morgan v. Zions N a t l Bank, 711 
i 'Jd 261 'Utah 1985). 
—Erroneously included d a m a g e s . 
Defendant, whose insurance company had 
vitisfied judgment against him in automobile 
tccident action which erroneously included 
imounts plaintiff had received as PIP benefits 
inder its insurance policy, could not seek to 
r.odify judgment to exclude erroneously in-
cluded amount by way of motion pursuant to 
••ither Subdivisions <b)<6) or '7). Laub v. South 
(\.«nt. Utah Tel. Ass'n. 657 P.2d 1304 (Utah 
P.W2). 
—Prospective app l ica t ion of j u d g m e n t . 
Kule permitting relief from a judgment on 
'he basis that it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment have prospective application was in-
applicable between the parties when the judg-
ment had been satisfied by the party seeking 
relief. Laub v. South Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n, 
*H P.2d 1304 (Utah 1982). 
Timeliness of motion. 
A motion to set aside a judgment that is 
^ised on a reversed judgment must be made 
*»thin a reasonable time. Guardian State 
Bank v. Stangl, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989). 
—Confused mental condition of party. 
There was no abuse of discretion in trial 
court's denial of plaintiffs motion to vacate or-
'W dismissing action entered pursuant to re-
°ase and stipulation of parties where motion 
*as filed six and one-half years after plaintiffs 
Physician detected plaintiffs confused mental 
•jmdition urged as basis for vacating motion, 
toung v. Western Piling & Sheeting. 680 P.2d 
-94 (Utah 1984). 
—Dismissal for lack of prosecution. 
where the evidence indicated that plaintiff 
nad not gotten in touch with his attorney for 
|wo years after filing complaint, it was proper 
°r court to deny plaintiffs motion to set aside 
a
 judgment, dismissing his complaint for lack 
if i i pM ' i i j i n t n Pitm.m v Konham. 
i !'J(i i l ' i i h ; : < M ' 
A trial court \ r< tasal to .-el aside a dismissal 
fi»r failure i<> prosecute will not he overturned 
absent .in abuse <>t'discretion. Meadow Fresh 
Farms v. Utah Stale I'mv. Uept. of Agric , 813 
P.2d 1216 -Utah Ut. App. 19911. 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in re-
fusing to -el aside a dismissal for failure to 
prosecute, where the underlying events oc-
curred in 19M. an initial action filed in 1983 
was dismissed for lack of prosecution, and the 
instant action based on the >ame facts was not 
filed until 1988. by which time many of the 
potential witnesses might have moved out of 
state and/or their recollection of the circum-
stances and events might have dimmed. 
Meadow Fresh Farms v. Utah State Univ. 
Dept. of Agric. 813 P.2d 1216 < Utah Ct. App. 
1991). 
—Fraud. 
A cross-complaint seeking to set aside a 
judgment for fraud in its procurement may be 
brought after the time limit in Subdivision (b) 
for a motion to set aside a judgment. Bowen v. 
Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P.2d 602 11952). 
Motion by ex-husband to order paternity 
blood test to furnish evidence on possible modi-
fication of support decree, based on fraud on 
court, was governed by time limit in this rule 
and was too late when filed 14' j months after 
divorce decree, even though baby was unborn 
and blood test could not have been performed 
before the divorce. McGavin v. McGavin. 27 
Utah 2d 200, 494 P.2d 283 (1972). 
—Invalid service . 
The three-months provision provided for in 
Subdivision <b» for motions to vacate a judg-
ment has no application to a judgment which is 
void because of invalid service of summons. 
Woody v. Rhodes. 23 Utah 2d 249. 461 P.2d 465 
U969). 
Where the judgment is void because of a 
fatally defective service of process, the time 
limitations of Subdivision tb) have no applica-
tion. Garcia v. Garcia. 712 P.2d 288 (Utah 
1986). 
—^Judicial error. 
Where judgment contained no clerical error 
amendable under Subdivision (a) but may have 
contained judicial error, trial court erred in 
granting motion to amend the judgment filed 
nine years after judgment was entered, since 
the error was not corrected by timely motion 
for new trial, appeal or suit in equity. Richards 
v. Siddowav, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 P.2d 143 
<1970). 
—Jurisdiction. 
In suit for injunction, wherein it appeared 
that parties stipulated that hearing on dam-
ages be deferred and tried later, and court 
made order that plaintiff might later file 
amended or supplemental complaint with re-
spect to issue of damages, district court did not 
lose jurisdiction of case because damage issue 
was not determined during term of court at 
which injunction was granted and no applica-
tion for relief "in furtherance of justice" was 
made within six months after term. Utah Oil 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
- Aooealabilitv of order suspending 
* ^ * ~ ^ e x e c u t i o n of sentence, ;>L 
tfnu 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
* * ^ oeal from final j u d g m e n t a n d o rde r . In a case in which an appeal 
** tt*d as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
4
^***^
 aDpeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
thin 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
****^  H)wever, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
"^ r unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
hg filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
^L of the judgment or order appealed from. 
M Motions post j u d g m e n t or o rde r . If a timely motion under the Utah 
<^-g*0f Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
•#«t4 under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
-*anjci of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
txtwd »f the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
^Mment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
*rtjci ahall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
t i#nying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
%4h Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
.«»gr Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
wctu aiTecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
ul parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
•* or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
^oaition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
t*m\ must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
•* order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided abcve. 
c» Filing pr ior to e n t r y of j u d g m e n t or o rde r . Except as provided in 
•A/aflraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
^mon, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
a tr ia l court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
4> Additional or c ros s -appea l . If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
*ftY, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
^ which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
^^•cnbed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
«* Extension of t ime to a p p e a l . The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
'*•• neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
^ motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
'**cnbed by paragraph ta> of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
~*cnbed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
^ceof a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
' ne other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. 
^*tension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
* of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
U T A H R U L E S ()K A l ' P E U . U ' F 1 !•:«»« "K!»« K i l l e - H 
^ W33 Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery 
J*1* of attorney's fees. 
•J*%1:":: _
 s for de lay or frivolous appea l . Kxuepi in .1 first appeal of 
^ 'P^ '2 a B c r in i ina l case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal 
i l ? * j e r these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it -hall award just 
<
* * *
a U n
 which may include single or double costs. ^ defined in Rule :-J4. 
^ ^ ^ a s o n a b l e attornev fees, to the prevailing party The court may order 
***
a f i t r C damages be paid by the party «>r by the party's attorney. 
~~ Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, 
^f r other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
***** | a W ? o r not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or 
*'* --^existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for 
'V* urpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to 
**ass cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will 
^cfit only the party filing the appeal, motion, bneL or oiher paper. 
c) P rocedures . 
ti) The court may award damages upon request ot any party or upon its 
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of 
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10. as part of 
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other 
paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court 
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show 
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order ro show cause 
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and 
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for 
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of 
oral argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the 
court shall grant a hearing. 
Advisory Commit tee Note. — Rule 33 .s 
•ubtttantially redrafted to provide definitions 
ad procedures for assessmg penalties L;r de-
ivs and frivolous appeals. 
If an appeal is found to oe frivolous, the court 
ius t award damages. This is :n keeping with 
Kule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, the amount of damages — .-.ingle or 
loubie costs or attorney lees or both — is left to 
'he discretion of the court. Rule 33 is amended 
•0 make express the authority of the court to 
impose sanctions upon the party or upon coun-
sel for the party. This rule does not apply to a 
first appeal of right in a criminal case to avoid 
the conflict created for appointed counsel by 
Anders v. California. 386 US 738 «1967) and 
State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 'Utah 1981). 
Under the law of the.-*? cases, appointed coun-
sel must file an appeal and brief if requested by 
the defendant, and the court must find the ap-
peal to be frivolous in order to dismiss the ap-
peal. 
MOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Frivolous appeal. 
-Defined. 
-Sanctions. 
I'ited. 
Frivolous appeal. 
A husband s appeal from a judgment relat-
n£ to aiimonv md distribution of marital 
Property was (nv..l.u>. where there was no ba-
*'S for the argument presented and the evi-
dence and law was miseharactenzed and mis-
stated. Fames v Karnes. 735 P.lid 395 (Utah 
1987). 
Plaintiffs .'.i.in.M-l violated rule and was 
therefore Mitv,,< t t... >.u;i!nui when, after he in-
s t i g a t e d pl.imntt 's malpractice action 
gainst defendant orthodontist and found that 
ne could not pro\e breach of duty or causation. 
the record was devoid of any relevant, admissi-
ble evidence showing negligence, and after los-
ing on summary judgment, he persisted in fil-
ing an appeal. Hunt v Hurst. 785 P.2d 414 
• Utah L9i)0>. 
An appeal brought from an action that was 
properly determined to be in bad faith is neces-
sarily frivolous under this rule. Utah IVp't of 
Social Servs v. Adams. SOH P '2d 1193 'Utah 
Ct. App. 1991). 
—Defined. 
For purposes of this rule, a "frivolous" appeal 
is one having no reasonable legal or factual 
basis. Lack ot good faith is not required. 
O'Brien v. Rush. , 'U P L\l 30« (Utah Ct. App. 
I987f 
A frivolous appeal is one without reasonable 
legal or factual basis. Backstrom Family Ltd. 
X 
I i lSTKHT i Ol 'RT nl 'KKATlnNS Kule H-404 
A*403- Shortening 90-day waiting period in domestic 
matters. 
*£ blish a procedure ior shortening or waiving the 90-day waiting pe-
H^domest ic cases. 
|gcabi l i ty : 
Hk rule shall apply to the district courts. 
^ e n t of the Rule: 
l Proceedings on the merits of a divorce action shall not be heard by the 
rid courts unless 90 days have elapsed from the time the complaint was 
Aot unless the Court finds that there is good cause for shortening or 
ainating the waiting period and enters a formal order to that effect prior to 
i bearing date. 
)> Application for a hearing less than 90 days from the date the complaint 
^ filed shall be made by motion and accompanied by an affidavit setting 
*A the factual matters constituting good cause. The motion and supporting 
idavit(s) shall be served on the opposing party at least five days prior to the 
%gduled hearing unless the party is in default. 
?3) In the event the Court finds that there is good cause for hearing in less 
an 90 days from the filing of the complaint, the facts constituting such cause 
ail be included in the findings of fact and presented to the Court for signa-
.^ 
tile 6-404. Modification of divorce decrees, 
ifcnt: 
To establish procedures for modification of existing divorce decrees. 
pplicability: 
i*his rule shall apply to all district courts. 
titement of the Rule : 
U) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be commenced by the filing 
;
 a petition to modify in the original divorce action. Service of the petition 
d summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance with the re-
rements of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a 
nification of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an order to show 
ise. 
2) The responding party shall serve the reply within twenty days after 
?rvice of the petition. Either party may file a certificate of readiness for trial. 
•pon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be referred to the domestic 
stations commissioner prior to trial, or in those districts where there is not a 
—nestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calendar. 
!3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a law and motion or order 
oshow cause calendar without the consent of the commissioner or the district 
udge. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS that future child support would be automati-
thviifi*..*.- v callv adjusted to reflect changes in income. 
^ubiJct " ° ? S U P P ? r t ; Such a provision violates § 78-45-7(1). which 
^oject matter jurisdiction. provides that a child support order can only be 
Modification of support. modified based upon a showing of a material 
"jaintiff was required to file a petition to change in circumstances. Grover v. Grover, 
Modify her divorce decree pursuant to this rule 839 P.2d 871 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
*ten she sought to enforce, by order to show Subject matter jurisdiction. 
•
au
«e, a provision in the decree that provided A district court other than the court issuing 
UTAH coyer OF APPEALS 
Lc-/.;:v;;;^y 
u ? u 
DOCKET NO. ^0^6^ I N THE UTAH C0URT 0 F APPEALS 
ooOoo 
John Carl Putvinf 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Karen Larie Thompson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
FILEO 
Utah Court of Appeais 
APR 12 199% 
ORDER 
Case No. 930359-CA 
This matter is before the court on appellants motion to 
strike the affidavit of Arnold Gardner, which is attached to 
appellees brief. In response, appellee suggests that the 
affidavit may be stricken only if this court strikes those 
portions of appellant's brief that appellee claims deviate from 
the record. However, this court does not have before it an 
appropriate or timely motion to strike any of appellant's brief, 
yet it is clear that the affidavit at issue is not part of the 
trial court record and, therefore, is not appropriately before 
this court. 
Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant's motion to 
strike is granted and this court will not consider either the 
affidavit of Arnold Gardner, or references to it in appellee's 
brief. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that appellant's request for 
attorney fees is denied. 
Dated this / Z^ tTay of April, 1994. 
IT: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 12th day of April, 1994, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United 
States mail to the parties listed below: 
Daniel Darger 
Attorney at Law 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Attorney at Law 
349 South 200 East, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Dated this 12th day of April, 1994. 
By -j/ttU ^ni0jiU.\) 
Deputy Clerk 
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